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Abstract: In this article, I seek to assess the extent towhich Theism, the claim that
there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the instantiation
of the grounding relation that connects the various entities within the layered
structure of reality. More precisely, I seek to utilise the explanatory framework
of Richard Swinburne within a specific metaphysical context, a ground-theoretic
context, which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the
existence of grounding. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we
will have a further reason to believe in the existence of God.
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1 Introduction
According toCorreiaandSchnieder (2012, 1), someofphilosophy’smost important
questions concernmatters ofontological priority,which is a concept that anumber
of philosophers take to be a natural and intuitive notion that has a storied history
dating back to the writings of Plato—specifically, the Euthyphro dilemma where
he asks: ‘Is what is holy, holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it
because it is holy?’ (Euthyphro, 178; 10a). In contemporary thought, a plausible
list of ontological priority claims that cut across the different areas of philosophy
is as follows:
(1) (Ontological Priority)
(i) (Mental): Mental facts obtain because of neurophysiological facts.
(ii) (Chemistry): H2O molecules are grounded by H, H and O atoms.
(iii) (Ethics): Normative facts are based on natural facts.
(iv) (Language): Meaning is due to non-semantic facts.
(v) (Set-Theory): Singleton-Socrates exists in virtue of Socrates.
(vi) (Aesthetics): What makes something beautiful are certain facts about the
perception of its beholders.
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What is of concern in these claims for philosophers is not somuch the truth-value
of the claims, but rather what is shared between the examples—which is that
of them jointly expressing some form of ontological priority that is related to
‘determination’, ‘dependence’ and/or ‘explanation.’ More specifically, there is a
common structure in the paradigm examples above, in that each of them contains
a connective that divides the sentences into an antecedent (i.e. what comes before
the connective) and a consequent (i.e. what comes after the connective). In each
of the examples above, the consequent provides some form of explanation for
why the antecedent obtains—the antecedent clauses seem to be explained by the
consequent clauses, which are both connected by expressions that enable the
consequent clauses to provide a reason for, or an account of , the antecedent,
based on the dependence or determination of the entities that are expressed
by the consequents. In recent times—specifically in the field of contemporary
metaphysics—a number of philosophers have focused on identifying the nature
of this expression—with a large number of individuals coming to understand it
in terms of a distinct metaphysical notion called grounding. In fact, this seems
to be an understatement as the notion of grounding has indeed taken hold of
contemporary metaphysical thought, with Clark and Liggins (2012, 812) stating
that this notion has now been ‘established as a major concern of metaphysics’.
More specifically, one area of concern that grounding has indeed featured
widely is in the burgeoning sub-field of ‘fundamentality’ through it underwriting
the thesis of metaphysical foundationalism—the view that conceives of reality as
a layered structure of various levels of fundamentality—with grounding fulfill-
ing the role of connecting the various entities within this hierarchical structure.1
Grounding is thus taken within this framework to be an expression that provides
a means for the nature and/or existence of an entity to be accounted for by ref-
erence to the nature and/or existence of another (ontologically prior) entity in
whom the former is dependent upon or determined by. Given this important use
of the notion of grounding (among other things), time and effort have been spent
on further explicating the nature of this dependence and determination. Yet, an
1 From the outset, the notion of grounding will be assumed to be a relation that connects
entities from different ontological categories—rather than that of a sentential operator that has
facts within its purview, for a highly influential construal of the latter view, see (Fine 2012).
Furthermore, the thesis of metaphysical foundationalism is to be contrasted with the thesis of
metaphysical infinitism—the view that there are, or might be, infinitely descending chains of
grounding—for a defense of metaphysical foundationalism, see (Bliss 2019) and for a further
explanation and defense of metaphysical infinitism, see (Morganti 2014). However, the thesis of
metaphysical foundationalism is sometimes mistakenly confused with the more controversial
notion of thewell-foundedness of grounding. For an explanation of the latter and the importance
of distinguishing both notions, see Dixon (2016) and (Rabin and Rabern (2016).
Grounding and the Existence of God | 3
important question that has only recently been focused on is that of the following:
in-virtue of what does the relation of grounding exist, obtain or is instantiated on
particular occasions?2 Does the existence of grounding within our layered struc-
ture of reality have a further, more fundamental explanation, or not? In other
words, does grounding itself need to be grounded? And if so, what entity(ies) can
fulfil this role? In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism—the
claim that there is a God—can indeed provide a true fundamental explanation
for the instantiation of the grounding relation within the layered structure of
reality. More precisely, I assume the cogency of Richard Swinburne’s explana-
tory framework and seek to utilise it within a specific metaphysical context, a
ground-theoretic context, which will enable me to develop a true fundamental
explanation for the instantiation of the relation of grounding on particular occa-
sions within the layered structure of reality. And thus, given the truth of this
type of explanation, we will have in front of us another abductive argument for
the existence of God—specifically, an argument for God’s existence based on the
fact of him being the best (fundamental) explanation for the instantiation of the
relation of grounding on any particular occasion that is picked out.3 Hence, at the
end of our exploratory journey, wewill thus have one additional reason to believe
in the existence of God.
Plan: in section two (‘Explanatory Framework’), I detail the nature of
Swinburne’s explanatory framework and resituate it within a metaphysical con-
text. In section three (‘Explanatory Target’), I explain the specific explanatory
target that is under focus—the instantiation of the relation of grounding—and
the thesis of Primitivism, which argues for the position that our explanatory tar-
get does not have, or need, an explanation for its occurrence. In section four
(‘Explanatory Analysis’), I assess Theism, Primitivism and two other candidate
2 This issue is termed in the literature ’iterated grounding’. Certain individuals have forwarded
interesting and important proposals that seek to address this issue, one of these proposals—that
of Bennett’s (2011, 2017)—will be further explicated below (with further alternative proposals
being noted there as well).
3 An abductive argument is a type of argument for the truth of a conclusion that employs
‘abductive reasoning’. Abductive reasoning is a form of reasoning that typically starts with a
set of data and proceeds from this set to the ‘best’ explanation for it, in accord with certain
explanatory criteria. Thus, the type of argument that will be formulated in this article is of this
kind—though it will be stated at an informal level. For a further explanation of the nature of
abductive reasoning, and a comparison of this type of reasoning with that of deductive and
inductive reasoning, see Douven (2021). Furthermore, the argument that features in this article is
to be read as an extension of a similar argument for the existence of God based on the existence
of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the layered structure of reality, which featured in
Sijuwade (2021c).
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fundamental explanations of our explanatory target: PriorityMonismandPriority
Pluralism, in light of their fulfilment of the inductive criteria detailed in section
one, with the final conclusion being that Theism is the only explanation that
fulfils these criteria—it is the simplest explanation, fitting with our background
knowledge, that leads us to expect the data, when otherwise it would not be
expected. Theism is thus the best candidate to be a fundamental explanation of
the instantiation of the relation of grounding within the layered structure of real-
ity. Finally, there will be a concluding section (‘Conclusion’) that will summarise
the position that has been argued for in this article.
2 Explanatory Framework
2.1 The Nature of Explanation
The provision of an explanation, as noted by Swinburne (2004, 23), is an ambigu-
ous exercise—it may refer, on the one hand, to someone having provided a true
explanation of a phenomenon, or, on the other hand, it maymean that the person
hasmerely provided apossible explanation of it. Nonetheless,whenone is indeed
seeking an explanation of the occurrence of a given phenomenon, they are cer-
tainly interested in arriving at a true, rather than simply a possible explanation of
it. Thus, understanding the nature of a true explanation, rather than solely that
of a possible explanation, will be our main focus. A true explanation, within a
general causal context, is provided for the occurrence of some phenomenon (i.e.
an event) when one states a set of factors that include within it a ‘cause’ (i.e. an
object and the set of conditions in which it was operative) and the ‘reason’ that
the cause was operative in the manner that it was.4 More fully, we can construe
the nature of a true (general) explanation as follows:
(2) (General Explanation) An explanation is a true explanation of the occurrence of a
given phenomenon when it invokes a what (i.e. a cause) that truly brought about the
phenomenon and a why (i.e. a reason) that explains its efficaciousness.
Once these factors are in place—the what and why—we have a true expla-
nation for the occurrence of a particular event. More specifically, a true general
explanation provides the correct answer to questions concerning what caused a
particular event to occur andwhy that event occurred in themanner that it did. In
4 The word ‘general’ is only used here and below to distinguish this type of explanation from
that of a metaphysical explanation.
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addition to this, a general explanation is also focused on providing a diachronic
explanation for the occurrence of a particular event by the invoking of a cause and
a reason that was operative over a certain period of time. Moreover, within this
particular explanatory framework, there are two kinds of explanation: inanimate
explanation and personal explanation. An inanimate explanation is an explana-
tion that invokes, first, an initial state of affairs—which will include an operating
cause—and second, some laws of nature—which are universal generalisations
of the form ‘all A’s are so-and-so’ or ‘all A’s do so-and-so’—in order to explain
the occurrence of a particular event (Swinburne 2004, 26). More specifically, an
inanimate explanation is distinctive in its inclusion of inanimate causation—and
thus the what is the initial conditions that include the cause, and the why is the
law of nature that was operative at the specific time in which the particular event
occurred. Thus, for example, the occurrence of an explosion is explained by the
ignition of a particular volume of gunpowder under certain conditions—which
is the what—in combination with a generalisation that under such conditions
ignited gunpowder explodes—which is the why (Swinburne 2004, 26). Personal
explanation, on the other hand, involves persons, their beliefs and purposes.
More precisely, a personal explanation is distinctive in its inclusion of intentional
causation—and so the what is the person, and the why are the beliefs, powers
and purposes of that person. So, for example, the occurrence of a hand wave is
explained by a person—which is the what—in combination with their power to
wave their hand, their belief that waving their hand will catch the attention of
someone,and theirpurposeof catching theattentionofacertain individual—each
of which constitute the why.
Taken together, we thus have two kinds of explanation for the occurrence
of a particular event—inanimate and personal explanation—which can then be
understood to come in at least three different forms: partial explanation, full
explanation and complete explanation. First, a partial explanation is a form of
explanation that includes factors—a cause and a reason—that only contributed to
the bringing about the occurrence of the phenomena under question—the factors
made it physically probable that theywould occur, yet these particular factors did
not necessitate the occurrence of the phenomena. For example, for an inanimate
explanation, an individual contracting Huntington Disease is partially explained
by their parent having had the disease. And, for a personal explanation, an
individual having died from lung cancer is partially explained by them having
smoked throughout their life.Within both kinds of explanation, the occurrence of
the latter events only makes it probable but does not necessitate the occurrence
of the former events. Second, a full explanation is a form of explanation that
includes a set of factors—a cause and a reason—that were together sufficient for
the occurrence of the phenomena—these set of factors are a ‘full cause’ of the
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phenomena and thus deductively entail, and really explain, its occurrence. For
example, for an inanimate explanation, the occurrence of a high tide is fully
explained by the sun, moon, earth, water, etc., being in certain positions and
by the operation of Newton’s laws (Swinburne 2004, 78). And, for a personal
explanation, a fridge door being left open is fully explained by an individual
having opened it in order to get some food. Within both kinds of explanation,
the occurrence of the former events is deductively entailed, and really explained
by the occurrence of the latter events. Third, a complete explanation is a special
form of full explanation that goes beyond this form by including within it a set
of factors—a cause and a reason—of which there is no explanation (either full
or partial) of their existence or operation in terms of contemporaneous factors
that exist and are operative at the time of their existence or operation.5 In other
words, the what and why—that is, the cause and the operative reason—do not
have any further explanation for their existence or operation on the basis of
contemporaneous factors—they serve as the terminus in explanation for a given
phenomenon at a specific time. For example, for an inanimate explanation, the
occurrence of a high tide is completely explained by the specific region of the
universe being relatively empty of matter and the operation of Albert Einstein’s
laws of General Relativity (Swinburne 2004, 78). And, for a personal explanation,
an individual having formed the intention to get some food from the fridge is
completely explained by their further intention to eat regular meals in order to
survive. Within both kinds of explanation, the occurrence of the former event
(or state) is deductively entailed, and really explained, by the occurrence of the
latter event (or state), and of which there is no further explanation in the form of
contemporaneous factors for the occurrence of the latter events (or states)—these
factors are the terminus in explanation for that specific phenomenon at a given
time.
Now, this explanatory framework—that includes the different kinds and
forms of a true explanation—can now also be extended into the metaphysical
realm. However, in doing this, we also realise that with a true, general expla-
nation, the provision of a metaphysical explanation is an ambiguous exercise as
well. Yet, despite this ambiguity, minimal understanding of a true metaphysi-
cal explanation, as noted by individuals such as Maurin (2019, 1574), is that of
it invoking entities and a principle—namely, an explanatory backing connection
suchas the relationof grounding—whichaccounts for thenatureand/or existence
5 At a more specific level, this form explanation is a synchronic—rather than diachronic—form
of explanation (Swinburne 2004, n3). brings this out. However, as the causes invoked by this
form of explanation are not simultaneous with their effects, I will continue to class this form as
a diachronic form of explanation.
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of one entity with reference to another entity, that the former non-causally and
synchronically depends upon. More precisely, we can construe the nature of a
true metaphysical explanation as follows:
(3) (Metaphysical Explanation) An explanation is a truemetaphysical explanation of the
nature and/or existence of a given entity when it invokes a what (i.e. a ground) that
the entity non-causally and synchronically depends upon and awhy (i.e. a principle)
that explains the reason for the dependence of the former entity on the latter entity.
Once these factors are in place—thewhat andwhy—wehave a truemetaphys-
ical explanation for the nature and/or existence of a given entity at a specific time.
More specifically, a true metaphysical explanation provides the correct answer to
questions of what determines or makes one entity exist and be what it is. More-
over, a metaphysical explanation, unlike a general explanation, is focused on
providing a synchronic explanation for the constitutive generation of a dependent
outcome at a specific point in time. And this is done by invoking an entity and a
principle or, more specifically, following Jonathan Schaffer (2017, 305), a ‘law of
metaphysics’—which is simply that of a counterfactual-supporting general prin-
ciple stating what grounds what.6 Now, as with a general explanation, there are
at least two possible kinds of metaphysical explanation: inanimatemetaphysical
explanation and personalmetaphysical explanation. An inanimate metaphysical
explanation is one that invokes an entity and a law of metaphysics in order to
explain the nature and/or existence of another entity—the what is the former
entity and the why is the holding of the law between it and the latter entity.
Whilst, a personal metaphysical explanation is one that invokes an entity, the
beliefs, powers and purposes of that entity and a law of metaphysics in order
to explain the nature and/or existence of another entity—the what is the former
entity and the why are the beliefs, powers and purposes of that entity and the
holding of the law between it and the latter entity. In the metaphysical domain,
and unlike in the general explanatory domain detailed above, inanimate and
personal metaphysical explanations converge—that is, laws of metaphysics are
present in both—where the only difference between these two different kinds of
explanation is that a personal metaphysical explanation, and not an inanimate
metaphysical explanation, includes the beliefs, powers and purposes of an entity
as an explanatory factor for the constitutive generation of a dependent outcome.
6 Schaffer (2017, 302) does not identify the laws of metaphysics solely with that of the relation
of grounding, primarily due to the fact that he was seeking to propose a minimal understanding
of these laws that could be widely accepted. Nevertheless, Schaffer (2017, 302) does indeed
personally conceive of these laws through the lens of grounding, and thus we will follow suit
with this specific conception of them as well.
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As with the general explanatory case, a metaphysical explanation of both
kinds can come in three different forms. It can, first, be a partial metaphys-
ical explanation, which is a form of metaphysical explanation that includes
factors—an entity and a law of metaphysics—that another entity is only par-
tially (non-causally and synchronically) dependent upon. For example, for an
inanimate metaphysical explanation, the existence of an H2O molecule is par-
tially explained by the existence of an h atom. And, for a personal metaphysical
explanation, the existence of a musical harmony at a certain time is partially
explained by the existence of one individual who is singing a note at that specific
time. Within both kinds of explanation, the existence of the latter entities does
not necessitate the existence of the former entities. Second, a full metaphysical
explanation is a form of a metaphysical explanation that includes factors—an
entity and a law of metaphysics—that another entity is fully (non-causally and
synchronically) dependent upon—the entity (or entities) that constitutes a part
of the explanatory set of factors is (or are) a ‘full ground’ of the other entity and
thus deductively entail, and really explain, its existence. For example, for an
inanimate metaphysical explanation, the existence of an H2O molecule is fully
metaphysically explained by the existence and arrangement of two h atoms and
anO atom. And, for a personalmetaphysical explanation, the existence of amusi-
cal harmony at a certain time is fully metaphysical explained by the existence of
two individuals who are singing a note at that specific time. Within both kinds
of explanation, the existence (and arrangement) of the latter entities deductively
entails, and really explains, the existence of the former entities. Third, a complete
metaphysical explanation is a special form of metaphysical explanation that
includes factors—an entity and a law of metaphysics—that another entity is fully
(non-causally and synchronically) dependent upon, and which their existence
is not (non-causally and synchronically) dependent upon another contempora-
neously existing entity. In other words, the what and why—that is, the existence
of the latter entity (and/or law)—is the fundamental reason for the former entity
existing. So, given the importance of the notion of fundamentality for this form of
explanation, we can now re-term a complete metaphysical explanation as a fun-
damental explanation. Thus, for example, and to pre-empt the main discussion
of this article, for an inanimate fundamental explanation, it could be the case that
the instantiation of the relation of grounding is fundamentally explained by the
existence of the Cosmos (or a collection of mereological atoms). Or, for a personal
fundamental explanation, it could be the case that the relation of grounding is
fundamentally explained by the existence of God. Within both kinds of explana-
tion, the existence of the latter entities deductively entails, and really explains,
the instantiation (or existence) of the former entity, and of which there is no fur-
ther explanation, in the form of contemporaneous, or,more fundamental factors,
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for the former entity being instantiated on that particular occasion. Taking all
of this into account, these are the different kinds and forms of explanation that
are available within a non-metaphysical and metaphysical context. The impor-
tant question to be faced now then is: what are the justificatory grounds for one
believing that they have acquired a true, complete explanation for the occurrence
of a given phenomenon or a fundamental explanation for the existence and/or
instantiation of a given entity?
2.2 Justification of Explanation
The justificatory grounds on which an explanation is judged to be a correct termi-
nus in explanation—that is, how probable it is that this explanation is a complete
or fundamental explanation of a particular event or entity—centres on the extent
to which it fulfils the following inductive criteria:7
(4) (Inductive Criteria)
(i) The Criterion of Predictive Power
(ii) The Criterion of Background Knowledge
(iii) The Criterion of Scope
(iv) The Criterion of Simplicity
For (i): the Criterion of Predictive Power, this criterion assesses whether the
postulated explanation predicts the occurrence of the event, or the existence
of the entity, when otherwise this event or entity would not be expected to have
occurred or to have existed. Importantly, however, as Swinburne (2004, 70) notes,
the ability for an explanation (of a general and metaphysical kind) to predict the
data does not imply that this explanation has to do this in a literal sense (i.e. that
the event or entities that constitute the datawill be observed tohave occurred or to
exist in the future). Rather, an explanation is only required to provide a sufficient
explanation for the data, whether or not this data was obtained in the past.
For (ii): the Criterion of Background Knowledge, this criterion assesses whether
the postulated explanation meshes with other explanations that are rendered
probable by this inductive criteria. That is, an explanation fits with background
knowledge if the causes or entities invoked by the explanation are similar to those
causes or entities that are taken to exist within other neighbouring fields.8
7 Knowledge concerning the truth of this inductive criteria, according to Swinburne (2001,
122), is obtainable a priori. Furthermore, these criteria are taken to be at the heart of scientific
and historical practice—that is, scientists and historians, according to Swinburne (2001, 74),
regularly employ these inductive criteria in their investigations.
8 Swinburne (2004, 60; 2010, 26) sees the Criterion of Background Knowledge as being limited
in its usage, in that it is only applicable to explanations that have a narrow scope as, according to
Swinburne, the amount of evidence that resides within the background knowledge, with which
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For (iii): the Criterion of Scope, this criterion assesses how much the postu-
latedexplanation seeks to explain.Generally, anexplanation that seeks to explain
more data is less probably true than one that is more restricted in its explanatory
range. However, as Swinburne (2004, 56) sees it, this criterion is not to be given
very much weight, since the specific restrictions of the scope of an explanation
are often arbitrary and complicated, and thus explanations that have a narrower
scope are—althoughmore probably true—typically less simple than explanations
of a much wider scope. Thus, given the importance of the Criterion of Simplic-
ity, which is to be seen now, the Criterion of Scope is generally less important
for determining the probable truth of an explanation. For (iv): the Criterion of
Simplicity, this criterion assesses whether the postulated hypothesis is quantita-
tively and qualitatively simple. The quantitative and qualitative simplicity of an
explanation is that of it postulating the fewest entities,9 fewest properties of enti-
ties, fewest kinds of entities, fewest kinds of properties, properties that are more
readily observable, the fewest separate laws with the fewest terms relating the
fewest variables, and the simplest formulation of each law being mathematically
simple (Swinburne 2004, 53). In following Schaffer (2015, 647),10 however, one
will need to modify this criterion within a metaphysical context by focusing the
quantitative and qualitative simplicity of an explanation on that of fundamental
entities, principles or laws, rather than all types of entities, principles or laws.
A probably true fundamental explanation is thus one that is quantitatively and
qualitatively simple. The quantitative and qualitative simplicity of a fundamental
explanation is thus that of it postulating the fewest fundamental entities, fewest
properties of fundamental entities, fewest kinds of fundamental entities, fewest
a given explanation will need to fit will decrease the range of its scope. Thus, in Swinburne’s
thought, there will not be any background knowledge that an explanation of enormous scope
will need to fit with. In response to this, Philipse (2012, 210–212) has argued that Swinburne’s
reasoning in support of one eliminating the Criterion of Background Knowledge is fallacious—it
is subject to the ‘fallacy of division’—and thusmust be abandoned. Adjudicating this debatewill
take us too far afield, and thus going forward, we will simply continue to maintain this specific
inductive criterion for our analysis of the candidate fundamental explanations.
9 Importantly for our later assessment of the candidate fundamental explanations, an entity is
taken here to simply be a ‘possibly existing thing’, and thus this criterion (and the modification
of it below) would apply to objects and relations.
10 Schaffer (2015), in a similar manner to Swinburne, also sees the importance of the Criterion
of Simplicity (or ‘Occam’s Razor’) for metaphysical theorising. However, Schaffer believes that
onemust also include a specific restriction to the range of the Razor, which is that of it only being
applicable to fundamental entities relations and/or properties—Schaffer terms this additional
restriction the ‘Laser’. Interestingly, however, Schaffer’s Laser does not distinguish between
quantitative and qualitative simplicity. Nevertheless, there is nothing inherent within the Laser
that should stop one from making this distinction.
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kinds of fundamental properties, fundamental properties that are more readily
observable, the fewest separate metaphysical laws with the fewest terms relating
the fewest variables and the simplest formulation of eachmetaphysical law being
mathematically simple. Nevertheless, for both explanations—general and meta-
physical—if an explanation posits the existence of some new particular object or
properties, it is required by the Criterion of Simplicity that it should postulate as
few as possible, and it should postulate no more than those that are needed to
explain the observational data.
These are the inductive criteria that provide justificatory grounds for holding
to the probable truth of a particular explanation. Within both kinds of explana-
tion, we seek the simplest explanation, fitting with our background knowledge,
which leads us to expect the phenomena or entities that do in fact occur or exist,
when otherwise this would not be expected. And the fulfilment of these criteria
is the grounds for one determining the stopping point for a purported complete
or fundamental explanation. Focusing our attention from here on fundamental
explanations, a full metaphysical explanation of the existence of a collection of
entities isa fundamental explanation, ifwebelieve that theexistence (or instantia-
tion) of the entities under question could only be explained further by postulating
further full grounds acting contemporaneously with the entities, which do not
have any more simplicity, greater fit with background knowledge and predictive
power than the full grounds (and laws) featured in the former explanation—these
full grounds would serve as the terminus of explanation. One would thus be jus-
tified in taking a certain candidate explanation to be a fundamental explanation
if one had reason to believe that any particular gain in the fulfilment of one of
the inductive factors (i.e. simplicity, fit with background knowledge or predic-
tive power) would be outweighed by a corresponding loss of another. Thus, for
example, any attempt to provide an alternative explanation of the existence of a
given entity would result in one postulating a more complex explanation—and
thus, it fails to fulfil Criterion (iv)—with only a potentially marginal gain in pre-
dictive power (or fit with background knowledge). One is thus tomove beyond the
data, and the currently existing explanations of it, only if there is a possibility of a
greater fulfilment of the inductive criteria, and that will be so if there is a potential
explanation that is simpler and/or explains the data better, whilst still fittingwith
background knowledge. Thus, in regards to Theism, and whether it can serve as
a fundamental explanation of a certain set of metaphysical data, one will need
to establish whether Theism, relative to the data, sufficiently meets the inductive
criteria. And if it does, given the nature that God is taken to have, hemust serve as
a fundamental explanation of this data. In short, once we establish that Theism
is probably true—that is, it is the simplest explanation, fitting with our back-
ground knowledge, that led us to expect the data, when otherwise it would not be
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expected—then one has reached a terminus in explanation. So, the question that
is nowpresented to us is: what is the nature of the particular phenomenon thatwe
are seeking a fundamental explanation of? In other words, what is our explana-
tory target? And how do Theism and any other potential explanation seek to
explain it?
3 Explanatory Target
3.1 The Nature of Grounding
It is an evident fact of reality that a variety of different things exist, ordered from
the very large things (e.g. planets, stars and galaxies) passing through the more
medium-sized things (e.g. flamingos, humans and buildings) to the very small
things (e.g. quarks, protons and neutrons). Some of these types of things are
taken to be dependent entities that are, in some sense, less important than some
other things within this structure. Flamingos, for example, appear to depend
upon the existence of planets and stars—and all would agree, though flamin-
gos are important as a species—without our planet and star existing in the here
and now, flamingos will also not exist in the here and now, and not vice versa.
Nonetheless, it is quite clear to most metaphysicians that the variety of content
that makes up our reality is arranged into layers, or a hierarchy of levels: galaxies
reside at the ‘top-level’ and thus are at a higher level than flamingos, that reside
at the ‘middle-level’, which are themselves, in turn, at a higher level than quarks,
that reside at the ‘bottom-level’ of this structure. Reality is thus multi-layered
with an increasing level of importance as you descend down its levels, or, as we
will see below, as you ascend higher up its levels. So, given this layered view
of reality, an important question that needs to be answered is: what makes a
certain phenomenon higher (or lower) and thus less important (or more impor-
tant) than another? A plausible answer to this question is that of each of the
phenomena being connected and ordered by a relation of dependence and deter-
mination, which provides a basis for this hierarchical structure. Thus, focusing
now on the scientific classificatory scheme: some phenomenon of economics:
goods and services, is dependent upon, and determined by, some phenomenon
of psychology: the mind, which is dependent upon, and determined by, some
phenomenon of biology: the brain, which is dependent upon, and determined by,
some phenomenon of chemistry: matter or chemical states, which is dependent
upon, and determined by, some phenomenon of physics: quarks. This structure
can be illustrated through Figure 1 as follows (with ‘Determined’ standing for
‘determined by’ and ‘Dependent’ standing for ‘dependent on’):
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Figure 1: Layered structure of reality (i).
Given this hierarchical scheme, some metaphysicians take the categories
residing within the lower levels of this structure (e.g. physics) to be more funda-
mental than those residing within the higher levels (e.g. biology and economics),
with an explanation for the existence (and/or instantiation) of the entities within
the higher levels ultimately terminating in the existence of an absolutely funda-
mental entity (or entities) within the lower levels. Following Bennett (2011, 27)
and Schaffer (2009a), we can take the term ‘fundamental’ that is at the heart
of this structure to be synonymous with the term ‘ungrounded’—such that if x
grounds y, then x is more fundamental than y (though not vice versa), and if x is
ungrounded, then x is absolutely fundamental—which is thus that of this type of
entity being one that has nothing in virtue of which it exists, obtains, or occurs.11
Now, with this distinction in hand, we can see that the key aspect of this structure
is that of the relation that connects andorders these entities—namely, the relation
of grounding. Thus, we can take the following phenomenon as our explanatory
target:12
11 For a more detailed unpacking of the notions of absolute fundamentality and relative
fundamentality (i.e. the relation of ‘more fundamental than’), see Bennett (2017, 102–136;
137–186).
12 Though this might simply be a trivial semantic issue—instead of a substantial metaphysical
one—following the lead of Bennett (2017) in using the notion of instantiation rather than that of
existence, this explanatory target can also be affirmed by nominalists who deny the existence of
properties and relations. For a further explanation of this, see Bennett (2017, 187–189).
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(5) (Explanatory Target) There is a relation of grounding that is instantiated on particular
occasions within the layered structure of reality.
This explanatory target captures certain phenomena that play a key role
in the layered structure of reality; however, these specific phenomena are not
the particular objects that occupy the levels of the layered structure of reality,
but the particular grounding relation that connects and orders these objects. As
previously stated, grounding is regularly characterised as a primitive expression
of dependence, determination or explanation. This expression has been champi-
oned by ‘grounders’ (i.e. grounding theorists) such as Fine (2012), Schaffer (2009a
and 2016), and Rosen (2010), amongst others,13 and can be precisely construed
as follows:14
(6) (Grounding)
(i) Directed andNecessitating: A primitive directed-dependency relation that nec-
essarily links the more fundamental entities to the less fundamental entities.
(ii) Explanatory and Generative: Ultimately backs synchronicmetaphysical expla-
nations for the nature and/or existence of the less fundamental entities with
reference to the more fundamental entities that generate them.
(iii) Causal: Identified as a species of causation—metaphysical causation—that
is mediated by (law-like) principles of grounding and aptly modelled by
Structural Equation Models.
As previously noted,what is of concern in the priority claims that are featured
in (1) above, is not so much that of weighing the truth value of these claims,
but rather that of one understanding the nature of the relation of priority and
fundamentality that is expressed by them. Hence, in explicating the particular
character of the relation of grounding, grounders usually focus on detailing the
specific formal principles, modal pattern, explanatory and generative roles, and
the analogous relationship to other relations which grounding has, which all
help to further demystify it. So, in following this demystification procedure, we
can see that the consensus for grounders is that grounding, in its standard ‘full’
variety:15
(7) (Full Ground) A given x is the ground of y if x on its own is sufficient to ground y.
is, firstly, governed by the following three formal principles:16
13 For a historical explanation of these individuals’ roles in developing the notion of ground,
see Raven (2020).
14 The following construal of grounding, as will be further detailed below, is that of Schaffer’s,
rather than that of the other grounding theorists.
15 For a further detailing of this variety of ground, and the other varieties of ground such as the
partial, immediate, mediate, weak and strict varieties, see Fine (2012, 51–53).
16 However, all of these formal principles are indeed controversial. Thus, firstly, for issues with
asymmetry, see (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2015). Secondly, for issues with irreflexivity, see Jenkins
(2011). Thirdly, for issues with transitivity, see Schaffer (2012).
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(8) (Irreflexivity) No x is grounded in itself.
(9) (Asymmetry) If x grounds y, then y does not ground x.
(10) (Transitivity) If x grounds y, and y grounds z, then x grounds z.
And, secondly, grounding is also generally taken to be governed by the
following principles that express a modal pattern:17
(11) (Non-monotonicity) If x grounds y, it does not follow that y is grounded by x and any
other fact (or entity) r.
(12) (Hyperintensionality) If x grounds y, it does not follow that x grounds any fact (or
entity) that is intensionally equivalent to y.
(13) (Necessitarianism) If x grounds y, then x necessitates y.
Thus,given the formalprinciples,grounding inducesastrictpartialorderover
the entities that are in its domain (Trogdon 2013).18 That is, grounding gives rise to
ahierarchyofgrounds, inwhich thegroundsofa fact (or entity), as JohannesKorb-
macher notes, “rank ‘strictly below’ the fact (or entity) itself” (Korbmacher 2018,
161, parenthesis added). And, given the principles that express a modal pattern,
groundingentails anecessarydependenceof thegroundedon thegrounds, in that
the existence of the latter entails the existence of the former. In short, grounders
guarantee what they ground (Trogdon 2013). However, they perform this necessi-
tatingaction ina ‘fine-grained’, rather thana ‘coarse-grained’manner, in that they
do not necessarily ground other superfluous entities as well. Thus, grounding, in
its most basic construal, is an expression that conveys some form of directedness
and necessitation. However, to aid us in our precisification task, it will be helpful
to now narrow our focus to unpacking a specific ground-theoretic framework that
has played an influential rolewithin the contemporary literature, that of Jonathan
Schaffer’s grounding theory. Within this theory proposed by Schaffer, grounding
is best modelled as a primitive ‘directed-dependency’ relation associated with the
notion of ontological priority. This directed-dependency relation takes in terms
from any arbitrary ontological category and links a more fundamental input to
a less fundamental output (Schaffer 2016). Hence, according to Schaffer (2009a),
there is an ontological ordering within reality, in that some entities are derivative
of other, more fundamental entities. The fundamental entities of reality ontologi-
cally undergird the derivative entities, and grounding is the relation that connects
the undergirding entity to entities that are at a higher level in the structure of
17 Firstly, for an explanation of the non-monotonicity of ground, see Audi (2012). Secondly,
for an explanation of the hyperintensionality of ground, see Jenkins (2011). Thirdly, for an
extended explanation of necessitarianism, see Trogdon (2013). And for issues with it, see
Leuenberger (2013). For a defense of it, see Cameron (2008).
18 For arguments against ground being a ‘strict’ order, see (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2015). For a
defense of ground as a ‘strict’ order, see Raven (2015).
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reality. Thus, within this perspective, there is a hierarchical view of reality that is
ordered by priority in nature. Once one distinguishesmore from less fundamental
entities, it is natural to posit a relation linking certain more fundamental enti-
ties to certain less fundamental entities which derive their existence from them
(Schaffer 2016, 145). Grounding is thus the name of this direct ‘linkage’ which is
governed by the above formal andmodal principles, connects themore to the less
fundamental entities and thereby imposes a hierarchical structure overwhat there
is (Schaffer 2009a). Now, closely related to ground’s ability to structure reality are
two further roles that it serves: its explanatory and generative roles, which are
captured by the following principles:
(14) (Separatism) If x grounds y, x backs an explanation for y.
(15) (Super-Internality) If x grounds y, then y exists and has its intrinsic nature in-virtue
of x and Rxy obtains in-virtue of x.
First, for the explanatory principle of ‘separatism’,19 explanation tracks ground-
ing, and grounding, in some sense, backs explanation. Grounding entails the
explicability of the grounded on the basis of its grounds and thus serves the
role of providing a synchronic metaphysical explanation for the nature and/or
existence of a less fundamental entity on the basis of the nature and/or exis-
tence of another, more fundamental entity (Schaffer 2016). Thus, the grounds
provide an explanation for the grounded—grounding is thus a relation that is
intimately tied to explanation. Secondly, for the generative principle of ‘super-
internality’, grounding is super-internal in the sense that the existence and
intrinsic nature of one of the relatum ensure, firstly, that the grounding rela-
tion obtains and, secondly, that the other relatum (or relata) exists with the
intrinsic nature that it has (Schaffer 2016).20 Thus, as there is a generation of the
grounded from the grounds, once there is a fixing of the intrinsic nature of the
grounds, there is also a fixing of the intrinsic nature of what is grounded and
the instantiation of the relation of grounding that connects the grounded to their
grounds. This emphasises the fact that the existence of the grounds is sufficient
to account for the grounded—grounding is thus a relation that is generative by
nature.
19 Another view within the literature is that of ‘unionism’ which identifies ground with
explanation. For a statement of this view, see Raven (2015, 326) and Maurin (2019, 1578).
20 That grounding is super-internal was first posited by Bennett (2011, 32–33)—more on this
important principle below. Furthermore, grounding’s super-internality is not to be confusedwith
the internality of other relations. As the former type of internality, andnot the latter, requires that
only one of the relatum exists in order for the relation to hold between the relata (nonetheless,
as grounding is super-internal, it is also internal in this sense as well).
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Consequently, given the fulfilment of these explanatory and generative roles,
grounding thusprovides thedirectionand linkageneeded formetaphysical expla-
nation and generation in a manner that is similar to the way in which causation
provides the direction and linkage needed for causal explanation and genera-
tion. More specifically, we can say that as the relation of causation links theworld
across time (i.e. causes are diachronically linked to their ’generated’ effects),21
the relation of grounding links the world across levels (i.e. grounds are synchron-
ically linked to the ‘generated’ (grounded) effects) (Schaffer 2016). Thus, as a
directed-dependency relation, grounding has many important features in com-
mon with causation, which leads one to infer that the best explanation of this
striking similarity is that of grounding being a type of causation: metaphysical
causation (i.e. grounding is identical to metaphysical causation). That is, follow-
ingWilson (2018),22 we can take the grounding relation to be a special case of the
causal relation where, as Wilson (2018, 724) notes, ‘whenever A grounds B, A is a
(metaphysical) cause of B and B is a (metaphysical) effect of A’. Metaphysical cau-
sation and nomological causation, are thus different species of the same genus:
causation, such that, for the former, once one (again) distinguishes the more
from the less fundamental, it is quite natural to posit an explanatorily-backing,
generative relation of metaphysical causation, which leads us to the following
final principle:
(16) (Causation) If x grounds y, then x causes y such that y is a generated ‘effect’ of x, as
mediated by the principles of grounding and aptly modelled by Structural Equation
Modelling.
The systematic analogy between grounding (i.e. metaphysical causation) and
causation (i.e. nomological causation) centres on themanner in which the causal
sufficiency relation is mediated within a causal and grounding context. More
precisely, if laws of nature mediate a given instance of the causal sufficiency
relation, then it is a case of nomological causation—for example, the throwing
of a stone is a sufficient nomological cause of the breaking of a window, as this
21 This viewof causation assumes an intimate link between causation and laws of nature. For an
alternative view that posits the possibility of scientific explanation/causation being expressed
without laws of nature, see Swinburne (2004, 34).
22 In following Wilson in taking grounding to be identical to causation (i.e. it is metaphysical
causation), we part ways with Schaffer (2016), who takes grounding to be analogous to, but
distinct from, causation. However, for the argument of this paper, nothing hinges on which
side of this intra-grounding debate that one takes—as the argument can be re-stated, without
substantial change, if grounding is taken to be analogous to causation rather than it being a
type of causation. Nevertheless, for the reasons why Schaffer does not make this identification
between grounding and causation, see Schaffer (2016, 94–96). And for a summary of reasons
why someone should make this identification, see Wilson (2018, 748).
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causal relation is mediated by laws of nature. Whereas if the (law-like) principles
of grounding fulfil the role of mediating a given instance of the causal sufficiency
relation, then it is a case ofmetaphysical causation—for example, the existence of
Socrates is a sufficientmetaphysical cause of the existence of Singleton-Socrates,
as this causal relation is mediated by the (law-like) principles of grounding.23
Grounding (i.e. metaphysical causation) and nomological causation are thus
simply different ways for the causal relation to be mediated and thus obtain
(Wilson 2018).
Now, this species similarity between grounding and causation can be fur-
ther elucidated through the use of the prominent formal framework of Structural
Equation Models, which were developed within a causal context by individuals
such as Judea Pearl (2009) and JamesWoodward (2003).24 The primary advantage
of Structural Equation Models, according to Schaffer (2016, 60), is that of them
providing the most precise method for detailing directed-dependency relation-
ships between entities. Hence, in a directed-dependency relationship, we have
the sources (i.e. causes, grounds) via a link (i.e. causal law, grounding principle)
generating a result (i.e. effect, derivative) which can be aptly modelled by the
input-function-output structure of Structural Equation Modelling (Schaffer 2021,
176). Thus, taking (Set-Theory) as a grounding test case, in the first stage, a Struc-
tural Equation Model starts with a representation of the system under study,
which is then divided into sets of independent and dependent variables. The
independent and dependent variables (in this case, Socrates and Singleton) are
then mapped to a specific range of allotted values as such:
Variables: <Independents = {(Socrates)}, Dependents = {(Singleton)}, Range =
{(Singleton)→ {0,1}, (Socrates)→ {0,1}}.
In the second stage, one then implements the functions given the ‘dynamics’
of the system, where, according to (Schaffer 2021, 177), there is a linking of the
dependent variables by the function that maps the values of the input variables
to their output value (where ‘<=’ is to be read as ‘is the output of’ (i.e. ‘Singleton
is the output of the set-formation function on Socrates’):
Functions: {(Singleton)<= set-formation(Socrates)}.
23 Wilson (2018, 1–2) is more instructive than Schaffer (2016) in highlighting the importance
of the different ways that the directed-dependency relation is mediated. Furthermore, Schaf-
fer (2016, 57) uses the terms ‘laws of metaphysics’ rather than ‘principles of grounding’ (or
‘grounding principles’) which feature in a later article (Schaffer 2021). As previously mentioned,
we can thus take both of these terms to be synonymous and continue using the latter.
24 Though more limited than Structural Equation Models, directed graphs are also helpful in
modelling directed-dependency relations. For an explanation of this, see Schaffer (2016, 63).
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Finally, in the last stage, one simply needs to evaluate the ‘fundamentality
conditions’,25 by assigning values to the independent variables according towhat
actually happened in reality:
Assignment: {(Socrates)= 1}.
By {(Socrates) = 1} being the case in reality, one can derive the result of
{(Singleton) = 1} for the respective model. Utilising a Structural Equation Model
in this way enables one to ascertain a viable synchronic metaphysical explana-
tion for why Singleton Socrates exists, from the existence of Socrates, via the
dependence function that captures the grounding principles (or, more specifi-
cally, the set-formation principle).26 That is, given that Socrates exists (Socrates
= 1) and the principles of grounding (set-formation) are at work, it is no coinci-
dence that theSingleton-Socratesexistsaswell (Singleton= 1). Singleton-Socrates
is the output of this principle on the input of Singleton ((Singleton) <= set-
formation(Socrates)), leading to an explanation for Singleton Socrates’ existence
(Schaffer 2021). Thus, a Structural Equation Model expresses how grounding, as
a metaphysical causation relation, provides the directed connection needed for
explanation and induces a hierarchical structural relationship that stems from
a more fundamental source (e.g. Socrates’s existence) via a link (e.g. the set-
formation principle) to a generated, less fundamental result (Singleton-Socrates’
existence). Therefore, in a grounding relationship, the more fundamental input
generates and provides an explanation for the less fundamental output anal-
ogously to how a (nomological) cause generates an effect and provides an
explanation for its occurrence—grounding is thus a metaphysical causation
relation.27
Taking all of these things into account, grounding is, therefore, to be con-
ceived of as a directed, necessitating, generative and explanatory metaphysical
causation relation. However, it is important to note now that an assumption has
been made concerning the unitary nature of grounding—that is, grounding has
been assumedhere to be anotion that captures a single, generic relation.Whereas
in recent thought, there has been divided opinion concerning whether grounding
is indeeda single, generic relationor if it is a variety of different relations—inother
25 In a causal model, these conditions would be the initial conditions, rather than the funda-
mentality conditions that are featured in a grounding model.
26 Theset-formationprinciplewouldbea specificapplicationof thegroundingprincipleswithin
a set-theoretic context.
27 For brevity’s sake, I will now no longer refer to grounding as metaphysical causation and
simply assume that grounding within this framework is to be identified as a (metaphysical)
causal relation.
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words, there is a division to be drawn between grounding monism and ground-
ing pluralism. Grounding monism is the position that there is a single species of
grounding relation—such that talk aboutwhat groundswhatwill refer to a single,
unified relation (Richardson 2020).28 Thus, for the grounding monist, grounding
is unified in that there is a generic grounding relation, rather than there being
multiple, equally fundamental varieties of grounding relations. In contrast to this
position, grounding pluralism is the position that there aremore than one species
of grounding relation—such that talk aboutwhat groundswhatwill refer to differ-
ent grounding relations in different contexts.29 Groundingmonism is prettymuch
a unified position; however, grounding pluralism can be further divided into two
distinct positions:moderate grounding pluralism and extreme grounding plural-
ism.30 Moderate grounding pluralism, as expressed by Fine (2012, 38–40), is the
position that there are three different notions of ground—normative grounding,
natural grounding, and metaphysical grounding—each of which captures a dif-
ferent type of relation that is found within distinct contexts of analysis. Whereas,
extreme grounding pluralism, as expressed by Wilson (2014), is the position that
there are a large variety of different kinds of grounding relations—many small
‘g’ grounding relations (such as token identity, functional realisation, the deter-
minable/determinate relation, the proper subset relation and the setmembership
relation etc.)—that do not form aunified kind under a general category of ground-
ing. Different types of arguments have been given for one adopting a grounding
monist or pluralist position.31 However, for the task at hand, we can simply con-
ceive of grounding as a notion that is identified as a single, generic relation or
as a variety of different types of relations (e.g. three or more different types of
relations). Nevertheless, for ease of reference, wewill continue to refer to ground-
ing as a single relation—without, however, this meaning that grounding monism
is being privileged here over that of grounding pluralism—with the distinction
between these positions being again re-stated at a later point.
Now, on the basis of this construal of the notion of grounding, we can now
slot this concept into the layered conception of reality detailed above, which will
result in the following structure found in Figure 2 (with ‘Grounds’ standing for
‘grounded by’ and ‘MFT’ standing for ‘more fundamental than’):
28 For a further explanation of grounding monism, see Schaffer (2009), Rosen (2010),
Audi (2012), Leuenberger (2013), Raven (2013), and Skiles (2015).
29 For a further explanation of grounding pluralism, see Fine (2012), Koslicki (2015), Wil-
son (2014), Cameron (2015), Bennett (2017), and Griffith (2018).
30 These labels come from Richardson (2020).
31 For arguments in favour of groundingmonism, seeBerker (2018). And for arguments in favour
of grounding pluralism, see Richardson (2020).
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Figure 2: Layered structure of reality (ii).
Reality is hierarchically arrangedwith chains of entities being ordered by the
relations of grounding, with the entities in the lower levels of this hierarchical
structure being taken to be the input of these grounding relations and the entities
that are at the higher levels of this structure being taken to be the output of these
relations. Grounding thus plays a fundamental role in structuring reality. How-
ever, two important questions for our specific task that cannowbe asked are: first,
whyshouldwebelieve thatanyrelationofgroundingexistsatall?And,second,are
these relations themselves fundamental or do they require a further explanation
for instantiation on a particular occasion?32 For the former question, in following
Schaffer (2017, 307–309), we can clearly affirm the existence of these grounding
relations within the layered structure of reality, due to the fact that, as there
are metaphysical explanations—the nature of which was detailed above—then
there must be relations of grounding that underwrite these type of explanations.
That is, assuming the existence of metaphysical explanations—which is indeed
a plausible assumption—one can affirm this position based on the fact of the
analogous nature between grounding and causation—where grounding, as noted
previously, is taken to be a species of causation: metaphysical causation. Thus,
32 The central issue tackled by this paper is thus not that of there existing any grounding
relations, rather than none at all, within the layered structure of reality—which is expressed
by the first question—but rather that of these relations being instantiated on any particular
occasion that is picked out—which is expressed by the second question.
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as causal explanations require laws of nature and/or relations of nomological
causation, then so do metaphysical explanations require analogous principles
and/or relations as well (Schaffer 2017, 305). That is, as Kment (2014, 5) notes,
there is a far-reaching structural analogy between causation and grounding. Just as earlier
states of the universe typically give rise to later ones by causing them,metaphysically more
fundamental facts give rise to less fundamental ones by grounding them. Certain general
metaphysical principles, which I will call ‘laws of metaphysics,’ play essentially the same
role in grounding as natural laws do in causation
Thus, by one considering the structure of causal explanation, one sees that there
is a particular requirement of this type of explanation for there to be certain
laws of nature that connect causes to effects. Thus, given the analogous nature
between grounding and causation, one can gain insight into the structure of one
of these relations on the basis of the other—as was previously shown through the
formulation of a grounding-based Structural Equation Model. Hence, as Schaf-
fer notes, ‘insofar as causal explanation requires laws of nature (and overall
involves a<Sources, Links, Result> dependence structure), metaphysical expla-
nation has a structurally parallel requirement’. So, one can affirm the fact of
there being counterfactually-supporting general principles—relations of ground-
ing—that fulfil the role of backing metaphysical explanation. In short, there are
indeed grounding relations that exist within the layered structure of reality.33
3.2 The Primitiveness Thesis
One can now re-ask our second important question of if these relations of ground-
ing themselves require a further explanation for their instantiation on a particular
occasion? That is, does the grounding require a fundamental explanation for its
instantiationonaparticular occasion, or is it, in fact, a relation that is instantiated
without explanation—namely, it is a fundamental relation, with the instantiation
of each token relation being a brute fact? A quick and easy answer would be
that each of grounding relations obtains on a particular occasion in virtue of a
further relation of grounding and a more fundamental ground—that is, they are
instantiated in virtue of the lower-level entities and the relation of grounding
that connects them to these entities. Now, this is indeed a sufficient explanation,
as the existence of the lower-level entities, and the holding of a further relation
33 For further arguments for the realityof ‘lawsofmetaphysics’ (i.e. the relation(s) of grounding),
which focuses on the fact of explanation requiring counterfactually-supporting general princi-
ples—laws of metaphysics—in order for it to play an important role with respect to unification,
manipulation, and understanding, see Schaffer (2017, 305–307).
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of grounding, necessitates the instantiation of the higher-level relation on that
particular occasion. That is, with each level that we descend down the layered
structure of reality (as is depicted in Figure 2), plausibly, we have a full meta-
physical explanation that is provided by a more fundamental entity and relation
at a lower level. However, one can indeed ask the question of if it is possible to
have a fundamental explanation for the instantiation of this relation? Is each of
the grounding relations that are a part of the layered structure of reality instanti-
ated on particular occasions in virtue of another entity (and law of metaphysics)
whose existence and operation is not (non-causally and synchronically) depen-
dent upon another contemporaneously existing entity (and law)?Well, according
to certain philosophers, a quick and easy answer to this question is no, as one
is, in fact, forced to take the relations themselves to be fundamental, and thus
there is no fundamental explanation for their instantiation on a particular occa-
sion. Now, the reason for this is that if one was indeed to take all the relations
of grounding within the layered structure of reality to be instantiated on a par-
ticular occasion in virtue of some other more fundamental entity, then we would
be presented with an apparently problematic regress that needs to be accounted
for. Following Schaffer (2017, 316), we can explain this regress as follows: let’s
say that a given relation of grounding obtains on a particular occasion. Either
there will be an explanation for the instantiation of this relation or not. If we take
the latter—that is, that there is no explanation for the instantiation of this rela-
tion—then therewill be an inexplicable fact about the instantiation of the relation
of grounding under question. However, given the plausible assumption that the
existence and/or instantiation of a grounded entity is explicable on the basis of
their grounds, and the relation of grounding that is operative, then it will follow
that the instantiationof the grounding relationwould indeedbeungrounded, and
thus the relation itself would be fundamental. If we take the former—that is that
there is an explanation for the relation of grounding under question—then this
explanationmust involve both a ‘source(s)’ of that relation—namely, the grounds
of that relation—as well as a ‘link(s)’—namely, a further relation that connects
the source(s) to the relation under analysis. Yet, if this relation is the same type
of relation as that of grounding, then you will face the issue of self-explanation,
which is problematic as this type of explanation would not be explaining the
instantiation of the relation under question but simply presupposing it. However,
if one were to say that the relation of grounding is not the same type of rela-
tion as the one that is under analysis—namely, a grounding relation—but rather
is an unidentified dependence relation, then this further relation would itself
either be fundamental or would also be one that exists in virtue of something
else—source(s) and relation—which themselves would either be fundamental or
would also exist or be instantiated in virtue of something else, and so on and so
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forth. However, assuming that there cannot be limitlessly descending chains of
deeper sources and relations, it is plausible that one must eventually arrive at a
fundamental source and/or relation. Hence, as Schaffer (2017, 316) notes, ’in no
case is it possible to explain the existence of the law L [relation], without bringing
in laws to explain L’s existence. Assuming that explanations cannot circle and
must terminate, at some point one must hit fundamental laws that serve as root
explanatory principles’.
Now, for clarity and succinctness—and to further emphasise the nature of the
problematic regress that is present here—we can re-state the issue at hand here
through ‘factive language’,34 which is synonymous to our ‘relational language’
and can act as a convenient shorthand for it as follows: suppose that A grounds B
and thus there is a fact that A grounds B, then if that fact must be grounded—and
thus is not fundamental—then there is something in virtue of which A grounds
B—let’s term this C. C grounds the fact that A grounds B. However, the fact that
C grounds the fact that A grounds B is another grounding fact that itself needs to
be grounded—let’s call its ground D. D grounds the fact that C grounds the fact
that A grounds B. Yet the fact that D grounds the fact that C grounds the fact that
A grounds B also requires a ground, and so we are off to the races, which can be
illustrated through Figure 3. as follows (with the arrows representing a grounding
relation and the ellipses representing a regress):35
Figure 3: Relational re-
gress (i).
In all, in the language of relations and facts, what we can clearly see here is
that one thus cannot attempt to explain the relation of grounding in any ‘deeper’
terms—it is a ‘stopping point’ in explanation. That is, there is no getting under-
neath the relation of grounding, such that, once one posits the instantiation
of the relation of grounding, there is no need for one to posit the existence
34 This synonymity is seen clearly here where, for example, the question ‘are the grounding
facts themselves grounded?’ is equivalent, as Bennett (2017, 189) notes, to the more awkward
question ‘are particular obtainings of grounding relations themselves grounded?’, which is
itself equivalent to ‘is there anything in virtue of which this grounding relation obtains on this
occasion?’.
35 The following illustration, and that of Figure 7, are based on that of Sider’s (2014).
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of anything deeper to explain their instantiation. In other words, the relation
of grounding lacks an explanation for its instantiation in the layered struc-
ture of reality and thus exists as a fundamental entity whose instantiation is
a primitive or brute fact. We can call this thesis proposed by Schaffer (2017)
the ‘Primitiveness Thesis’ (hereafter, Primitiveness), and state it succinctly as
follows:36
(17) (Primitiveness) There is nothing in virtue of which the grounding elation is instan-
tiated on particular occasions.
According to Primitiveness, the entities that feature in our explanatory target lack
an explanation of their existence—that is, in other words, they are themselves
absolutely fundamental, and thus facts about their existence are primitive and/or
brute facts. Theismwill thus be assessed for its veracity in light of this alternative
option of there not being an explanation of our explanatory target and some
‘anti-primitive’ candidate fundamental explanations—where an explanation is
anti-primitive in this context if it takes there to be a further, deeper explanation
for the instantiation of the relation of grounding—that is, our explanatory target
has a fundamental explanation by the relation of grounding being instantiated
in virtue of something else.37
Now, as noted above, there are at least two possible kinds of fundamen-
tal explanation: inanimate fundamental explanation and personal fundamental
explanation. The thesis of Primitiveness and the candidate explanations that fall
into either of these kinds will need to be assessed by the inductive criteria that
were introduced in the previous section. Importantly, however, when one is con-
sidering explanations (or explanatory stopping points) of the existence of all of
the relations of grounding, each of these theses will be of enormous scope.38
Therefore, unless we are to dismiss these and all other potential fundamental
explanations, Criterion (iii) will need to be left out of our assessment. Thus,
any thesis or candidate fundamental explanation under question will need to be
assessed by Criterion (i), (ii) and (iv), which boils down to an explanatory stop-
ping point or a candidate for a fundamental explanation, in this specific context,
being most likely the correct/true one, if it is the simplest explanation, fitting
36 Though Schaffer (2017) forwards this thesis, in earlier writings—as will be shown
below—Schaffer defends an anti-primitive option that is found within the field of fundamental
mereology.
37 In this specific context, the terms ‘primitiveness’ and ‘anti-primitive’ stem fromBennett (2017,
188–189).
38 I add the clause ‘(or explanatory stopping points)’ to allow Primitiveness, which is not an
explanation, to be included within our framework.
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with our background knowledge, which predicts the instantiation of the relation
of grounding onparticular occasions,whenwewouldnot otherwise expect to find
them. Given this framework and the exposition of our explanatory target, it will
be important to now turn our attention to unpacking the inanimate and personal
explanatory candidates for a fundamental explanation, and then, off of this, we
can provide an assessment of the veracity of Primitiveness and these explanatory
candidates, according to our inductive criteria.
4 Explanatory Analysis
4.1 The Nature of the Candidates
In contemporary metaphysics, three ‘anti-primitive’ candidates for a fundamen-
tal explanation for our explanatory target present themselves: Theism, Priority
Monism and Priority Pluralism. For the latter two: Priority Monism and Priority
Pluralism—eachofwhich isacandidate inanimate fundamental explanation—we
have two physics-based explanations that support the commonly held view that
whatever is at the fundamental layer of reality, and thus is the terminus in expla-
nation for everything above (or below it), is of a physical nature—in short,
everything bottoms out at the feet of a physical entity (or entities). Whereas,
for the former: Theism—which is a candidate personal fundamental explana-
tion—we have a theologically-based explanation that supports a view that the
fundamental layer of reality, and terminus in explanation for everything above
(or below it), is of a non-physical nature—in short, everything bottoms out at the
feet of a non-physical fundamental entity. So, these are the three candidate expla-
nations for the instantiation of the relation of grounding on particular occasions
within the layered structure of reality. And thus, it is these candidate fundamental
explanations (and the thesis of Primitiveness) that will need to be assessed for
their veracity according to our inductive criteria. However, prior to performing
this assessment, it will be helpful to now briefly detail the nature of the enti-
ties that are posited by these explanations. We can turn our attention first to
that of Theism, and then after this, we can focus on the other two alternative
candidates.
The theistic explanation centres around the simple claim that ‘there is a
God’. This claim is a personal metaphysical explanation—it seeks to provide
an explanation that invokes the powers, beliefs and intentions of a personal
agent—and it is a claim that is at the heart of the major theistic world religions
such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Sikhism. Now, there are various ways to
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construe this particular claim; however, the specific way that it will be construed
here is as follows:39
(18) (Theism) There is a God, identified as a metaphysically simple, omnipotence-trope.
This specific rendering of Theism centres around the notion of a ‘powerful
trope’—apowerful abstract particular natureof amodifier ormodular kind—which
has been introduced and defended by various ‘trope theorists’ such as
Williams (1953), Campbell (1990), Maurin (2002), Fisher (2018, 2020) and Molnar
(2003), among others. In breaking this concept down in a stepwise manner, we
can understand that: first, a trope is abstract, not in the sense that it lacks spatio-
temporality, but in the sense that it is ‘less than its content’ and does not ‘exhaust
its plime’—in short, multiple tropes can be co-located together to form a compre-
sent bundle. For example, a shape-trope that a table possesses is abstract because
it does not exhaust its content, as other tropes, such as a colour-trope and amass-
trope, are also collocatedwith the shape-tropebyoccupying the same content (i.e.
the table).However, in contrast, the tablewouldbe concreteby itself exhausting its
content and thus not allowing another table (or object) to also occupy this content
(Williams 1953). Second, a trope is particular in the sense that it canhave adistinct
duplicate—in other words, Leibniz’s Law (i.e. the identity of indiscernibles) fails
to hold for it.40 That is, for properties as universals, the Law holds, in that exactly
similar entities (i.e. universals) are identical (i.e. if universal x and universal y
are indiscernible, then x = y). Whereas for particulars (e.g. tropes), the principle
does not hold, as exactly similar entities can be distinct (i.e. if trope x and trope y
are indiscernible, then x ≠ y). For example, a shape-trope is particular because it
is possible that there is a duplicate of this shape, that is, an entity that is exactly
similar, but also distinct from this shape. In short, a trope is particular if it can
39 In Swinburne’s (2004, 93–96) conception of Theism, God is, amongst other things, an essen-
tially, everlastingly omnipotent, bodiless spirit. This conception of God has been challenged by
individuals such as Philipse (2012, 205), who argues that the notion of a bodiless spirit fails
to fit with our background knowledge concerning the type of entities that are taken to exist
in neighbouring fields. Given this issue, Criterion (ii) is not met by Swinburne’s conception of
Theism. However, as explained previously, Swinburne (2004, 66) does not see Criterion (ii) as
being overly important for explanations of a wide explanatory scope, and thus does not see this
to be a problem. Nonetheless, the present construal of God does not succumb to this issue, given
the widely held assumption amongst philosophers concerning the existence of tropes, and thus
Criterion (ii) can be met by Theism so construed. This widely held assumption will be further
explained below.
40 Leibniz’s Law, which is often conceptualised as the principle of the indiscernibility of iden-
ticals, is conceived of here as its converse—the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which
can be stated formally as such: ∀𝜑(𝜑(x)↔ 𝜑(y)→ x= y).
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have a duplicate. Third, a trope is its intrinsic (qualitative) nature, in that it does
not have, or possess, a nature of its own; rather, it is combinatorially intrinsic in
the sense that the nature of a trope is invariant under the scenarios in which the
given trope is alone or accompanied (Alvarado 2019, 554). However, the modal
invariance of a trope, unlike other entities, is not grounded upon the possession
of an intrinsic nature, but that of it being its intrinsic nature—it is numerically
identical to it. There is nothingmore to a trope than its nature, and thus, as noted
by Maurin (2018, §2.2), tropes, at a general level, “have no constituents, in the
sense that they are not ‘made up’ or ‘built’ from entities belonging to some other
category”. Tropes are thus primitively qualitative and irreducible entities—they
lack proper parts,41 and thus are metaphysically simple entities.42 Fourth, a trope
can come in two forms: as a modifier or as a module trope. The central differ-
ence between a modifier trope and a module trope is that of the former being
a singly (or minimally) characterising property, whilst the latter is a singly (or
minimally) charactered property in a ‘stretched’ (or analogical) sense— it is a
‘propertied thing or object’, where an object is a countable, property-bearing par-
ticular that has determinate existence and identity conditions and is not borne
or possessed by anything else.43 In other words, a modifier trope is a property
that does not exemplify this character, but simply bestows it upon (i.e. ‘makes’)
something else to be charactered in that specific way. Thus, for example, a partic-
ular object is spherical in virtue of its modifier trope, which ‘spherises’ that object
by simply making it spherical without it sharing in that character as well. The
character grounding provided by a modifier trope is thus de novo (or sui generis)
(Garcia 2015a). Whilst, a module trope is an object that exemplifies the character
that it grounds (i.e. is self-exemplifying). Thus, for example, a particular (thickly-
charactered) object is spherical and red in virtue of its module tropes, which are
themselves spherical and red (i.e. exemplify sphericity and redness), and together
(compresently) are parts (or constituents) of that object. A module tropes’ char-
acter grounding, rather than being de novo, can thus be taken to be some type
of parthood (or constitution) relation (Garcia 2016). Furthermore, an additional
distinction between modifier and module tropes is the role played by these types
of tropes in causation. At a more specific level, it is solely module tropes, rather
than modifier tropes, that can play any direct role in causation. As, for example,
a modifier hotness trope cannot fulfil the role of being the direct cause of a burn
mark that an individual has, as it is not itself hot; something else must thus be
the direct cause of the burnmark (Garcia 2015a, 643). Modifier tropes, in a similar
41 More on the nature of a proper part below.
42 More on the nature of metaphysical simplicity below.
43 I leave the account of analogy here undefined.
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manner to universals, are thus causally inert. However, themodular viewdoes not
have this issue, given that module tropes are self-exemplifying entities, resulting,
in our example above, in a modular hotness trope being able to be the direct
cause of the burn mark. Therefore, it is module tropes, and not modifier tropes,
that are uniquely suited to be the basic terms of causation (Garcia 2015b). Lastly,
a trope, following Molnar (2003), is powerful in at least five ways: it is, first,
directed—in that a powerful trope is directed towards some characteristic and
distinctive manifestation.44 Second, it is independent—in that, a powerful trope
is ontologically independent of its manifestations; that is, it can exist when it is
not being manifested. Third, it is actual—in that a powerful trope is an occurrent
feature of the object that possesses it. Fourth, it is intrinsic—in that, a powerful
trope is intrinsic to its bearer.45 Fifth, it is objective—in that the existence of a
powerful trope is not dependent on the existence of any conscious, observing
minds. A trope, of a modifier or modular kind, is thus powerful in that it fulfils
the roles of directedness, independence, actuality, intrinsicality and objectivity.
Taking this concept of a powerful module trope into account, and applying
it within a theistic context, we can posit that God is, first, abstract in the sense
of him having the trait of being ‘less than the including whole’—God does not
exhaust his ‘content’ or ‘plime’ (or is less than his ‘content’ or ‘plime’)—where,
in assuming Christian Theism, we take this content or plime to be the Trinity
as a whole and its location—as its content or plime also includes the possibility
of other tropes being collocated with him (i.e. the Son and the Spirit), which
results in him not exhausting either of these things—in short, wherever God is
located there are other tropes that are located there with him. Second, God is
particular by him failing to abide by Leibniz’s Law—as, in assuming Christian
Theism again—there is the possibility of the existence of entities—duplicates,
identified as the Son and the Spirit—that are exactly similar in their intrinsic
properties (i.e. their nature) to him, yet are numerically distinct from him. Third,
God is identical to his qualitative nature—he is the specific character that he
has, which is that of him being omnipotent. God’s nature is thus intrinsic to
him, not in the sense of him possessing a further intrinsic ‘property’, but simply
that of him being numerically identical to this nature. Fourth, God is a module
trope, rather than a modifier trope, which is that of him being a maximally-thinly
charactered object—a property in an analogous sense (i.e. a property∗)—that is
self-exemplifying and, in assuming Christian Theism again, serves the role of
44 An assumption is made here concerning a powerful trope being multi-track, rather than
single-track.
45 We can assume the notion of intrinsicality noted above.
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bestowing this characteristic upon the Trinity which he constitutes. Moreover,
since God is a trope of a modular kind, he plays a direct role in causation and is
thus a basic term of a causal relation. Lastly, as amodule trope, God is powerful in
fiveways: he is, first,directed—in that God (or his action) is directed towards some
characteristicanddistinctivemanifestations, suchas thatof creatingor sustaining
theuniverse. Second,he is independent—in thatGod is ontologically independent
of hismanifestations; that is, he exists when his power is notmanifested.46 Third,
he is actual—in that God is an occurrent feature of the object that possesses him:
the Trinity. Fourth, he is intrinsic—God is intrinsic to his bearer, which is, again,
the Trinity. 47 Fifth, he is objective—in that the existence of God is not dependent
upon the existence of any conscious, observingminds. God, as a module trope, is
thus powerful in that he fulfils the roles of directedness, independence, actuality,
intrinsicality and objectivity. However, he does this without any of the limitations
that certain other powerfulmodule tropesmay have. In short, God is an unlimited
powerful trope—anomnipotence-trope,which canbe illustrated throughFigure 4
as follows:
Figure 4: God andmod-
ule trope identity.
46 Though in the grounding of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the layered structure
of reality, God’s power will not move from inactivity to activity but, instead, would always be
manifested, given that this grounding actwill be a necessary action that stems fromGod’s perfect
goodness. More on this below.
47 As Christian Theism is being assumed here, God is taken to be a ‘part’ of the Trinity and thus
is borne by, and works through, the Trinity (i.e. in cooperation with the Son and the Spirit). This
conception of the Trinity assumes the notion of the ‘monarchy of the Father’—the teaching that
God is numerically identical to the Father alone—which is contrary to the common position that
holds to God being numerically identical to the Trinity. The difference between these positions is
more than a linguistic issue as proponents of the monarchy of the Father will take the existence
of the Father to be the basis for Christian Theism being monotheistic—as there is ‘one Father’
there is ‘one God’—whereas proponents of the common position would take the existence of the
Trinity to be the basis for Christian Theism being monotheistic—the ‘unified collective’ (i.e. the
Trinity) is the ‘one God’. For a further philosophical explication of the notion of the monarchy
of the Father and its application to the Trinity, see Sijuwade (2021b).
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As an omnipotence-trope, God is a personal entity—a personal module
trope—due to the fact that for him to exercise his omnipotence, he must be an
entity that has a rich formof consciousness that enables him to perform a range of
actions that are solely limited by logic. Thus, to ward off a potential objection that
can be raised here, conceiving of God as a trope does not rob him of this person-
hood, given that he is a trope of a modular nature (i.e. a property∗). Furthermore,
given his omnipotence, God would be an entity that is unlimited in knowledge,
presence, freedom and goodness. That is, it follows from his omnipotence that
God would, firstly, be omniscient—he would know of all true propositions (con-
cerning the past and present), that they are true—as, if he is to be able to exercise
his omnipotence, hewould need to know the nature of the alternative actions that
are dependent upon what occurred in the past and what is presently occurring.
Secondly, being omnipotent and also omniscient, Godwould be omnipresent—he
would be cognizant of, and causally active at, every point of space—and thus
would be present to all existing things through his knowledge concerning them
and his power to act upon them. Thirdly, being an omnipotence-trope, he would
also be perfectly free—hewould be free fromanynon-rational influence determin-
ing the choices that he makes—as if he is to be able to exercise his power in any
logically possible way, then his powermust operatewithout any causal limitation
or hindrance. Fourthly, being omniscient and perfectly free, God would also be
perfectly good—he will always perform the best action (or kind of action) if there
is one, many good actions and no bad actions. That is, given God’s omniscience,
he would know the nature of each available action that he can choose from and
thus would possess knowledge of whether each action is good or bad, or is better
than some incompatible action. Moreover, in recognising an action as good, God
would have somemotivation to perform that action, and in recognising an action
as being better than another action, Godwouldhave an even greatermotivation to
perform it (Swinburne 2016). Hence, given his perfect freedom, if God is situated
in a scenario in which there is a best possible action (or best kind of action) for
him to perform, then God will always perform that action (or kind of action), and
if there is no best action (or kind of action), then God will perform a good action
and no bad actions.48
These are the attributes—omniscience, omnipresence, perfect freedom and
perfect goodness—that are derivable from the supposition that God is an
omnipotence-trope. However, in construing God as a module-trope, we can also
take him to bemetaphysically simple, given the non-composite and irreducibility
of a trope. And so, in conceptualising God in this particular way, we can see that
48 Whereas in recognising an action as bad, God would have no motivation to perform it.
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the derivable attributes of God—unlike Swinburne, who takes these attributes to
be related to God (and each other) by an ‘entailment relation’—are in fact related
to God (and each other) by a relation of ‘numerical identity’.49 More specifically,
according to thenotion ofmetaphysical simplicity, God is non-composite and irre-
ducible in the sense of him lacking proper parts—where a proper part is a portion
of an entity that is numerically distinct from it. Thus, by taking God to be meta-
physically simple, there is no portion of God that is numerically distinct fromhim.
God is a beingwho intrinsicallywithin himself does not have any division or onto-
logical composition—be it spatial, temporal or metaphysical composition—God
must be such that he does not have any sort of complexity involving composition.
So, the denial of metaphysical complexity in God is thus also a denial of him
possessing any properties as well. More specifically, God does not exemplify any
numerically distinct properties (i.e. proper metaphysical parts). Since if Godwere
to exemplify these properties, he would be dependent upon them in order to be
what he is. Yet, as God cannot be dependent in specific this way—given that he
is omnipotent—he thus must not be the bearer of any properties. Rather, any
intrinsic property ‘attributable’ to God must be numerically identical to him. For
example, if the intrinsic property of goodness is attributed to God, then one is not
properly attributing to him an ontologically distinct property that he exemplifies.
Rather, God is instead taken to be identical with his goodness (and all the other
properties that are attributed to him aswell). Moreover, given that God is identical
to eachofhis attributes, onemust also infer that his attributes are identical to each
other due to the transitivity of identity. Thus, God’s identitywith his goodness and
his power entails the fact of his goodness being identical tohis power (and, again,
for all of the other properties that are attributed to him). Therefore, on the basis of
God’s metaphysical simplicity, there is, firstly, no numerical distinction between
God and his attributes and, secondly, there is no numerical distinction between
49 As God has ‘attributes’ (or ‘characteristics’), but these attributes (or ‘characteristics’) are not
to be conceived of as ‘properties’, one can ask what the nature of these entities is? One way
is to conceive of these attributes as ‘aspects’—qualitative differing, yet numerically identical
particular ways that an entity is. Construing these entities in this way enables the primary
objections against the cogency of the notion of metaphysical simplicity to be put to rest—as
God is taken to bear (qualitatively differing) ‘divine aspects’, rather than ‘divine properties’,
which enables God’s power, knowledge, goodness, etc., to be numerically identical to him and
each other—as aspects are numerically identical to their bearers and one another—whilst still
maintaining a qualitative distinction between them—as aspects qualitatively differ from their
bearers andone another. God thushasmultiple, qualitatively differing aspects that are ‘improper
parts’ ofhim (i.e., numerically identical toGod) rather than ‘properparts’ ofhim (i.e., numerically
distinct from God). For reasons of space, this account will not be further detailed. However, for
a further explanation of this account, see Sijuwade (2021a).
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eachofGod’s attributes aswell, as canbe seen throughFigure 5. As follows (where
the double-headed arrows represent a numerical identity relation):
Figure 5: God and attri-
butes identity.
Theism thus postulates the existence of one, metaphysically simple (and
personal) module trope: God, who has the single character of omnipotence and is
numerically identical toeachof theattributesofdivinity thatare rightlypredicated
of him. So construed, God is a fundamental entity, by his metaphysical simplicity
and omnipotence rendering him as an explanatory stopping point—his non-
compositeness and irreducibility would thus not require him to be an output of
a grounding relation, and by him possessing the ability to perform any logically
possible action, anything that exists will be by him willing, or permitting, it to
exist. Therefore, if Godexists, he is rightlyunderstoodas ametaphysically simple,
omnipotence trope that exists fundamentally. We can now turn our attention to
fleshing out the nature of the alternative, anti-primitive candidate fundamental
explanations of Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism.
In the field of fundamental mereology, Schaffer (2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2013,
2018) has proposed a distinction between the notions of Priority Monism and Pri-
ority Pluralism. At a basic level, the priority monist holds to the whole being prior
to its parts and thus takes there to be only one fundamental entity in the layered
structure of reality. In contrast, the priority pluralist holds to the parts being prior
to the whole and thus takes there to be more than one fundamental entity in the
layered structure of reality. More precisely, according to Schaffer (2010, 33–37),
there are two structures within reality: amereological structure of whole and part
and a metaphysical structure of prior and posterior. The latter type of structure:
metaphysical structure, which we have been operating within, captures the fact
of one entity being built by another entity, and ultimately reveals what is (or
are) the fundamental entity (or entities) that serves as the builder(s) of all other
reality—in short, all chains of building ultimately terminate in this entity (or
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entities). The debate between priority monists and pluralists, in Schaffer’s (2010)
thought, is thus concerning the right correlation between this mereological order
of whole and part and the metaphysical order of priority and posteriority. More
specifically, it concerns the identification of what is fundamental among exist-
ing concrete entities. As priority monists and pluralists both hold to there being
a maximally actual concrete object—the material Cosmos—of which all other
actual concrete, material objects (e.g. planets, pebbles and particles etc.) are
proper parts. The assumption is thus made on both sides that there is a Cosmos,
that it has proper parts and that it is not identical to any plurality of its proper
parts (i.e. composition is not identity). Thus, the central distinction between these
two positions centres on how to carve up the Cosmos (Schaffer 2010, 42). Focusing
first on PriorityMonism, adherents of this view see the correct way to carve up the
Cosmos as that of leaving the whole uncut. Thus, on this view, there is solely one
fundamental actual concrete object: the Cosmos itself. Importantly, however, and
in distinction from existence monism—the view that solely the Cosmos exists and
nothing else—there are many other concrete, material objects; yet, these objects
exist only in a derivative manner as proper parts of the one fundamental entity
that is the Cosmos. Thus, in providing a precisification of this view, we can state
the monistic position succinctly as follows:
(19) (Priority Monism) The whole, identified as the Cosmos, is the single, fundamental
concrete object that is ontological prior to all other actual concrete material objects,
which are its proper parts.
Now, it is not built into the notion of Priority Monism that the single funda-
mental entity: the Cosmos, has any particular nature. Rather, the notion so
characterised is strictly a numerical thesis concerning the number of fundamental
entities—which, forPriorityMonism, is that of therebeingone.However, a specific
way of further detailing the nature of this fundamental entity has been provided
by Schaffer (2013).50 In this particular construal of Priority Monism, the nature
of the Cosmos—the fusion of all actual concrete, material objects—is, according
to Schaffer (2009b, 132–133), to be identified as the general-relativistic spacetime
manifold. And material objects—the proper parts of the Cosmos—are to be iden-
tified as regions of spacetime. Thus, the spacetime manifold that is the Cosmos
is a single substance that instantiates properties directly—that is, without any
mediation of material objects. Rather, the properties are ‘pinned down’ onto the
spatiotemporal substance. The Cosmos thus possesses proper parts—identified
as spacetime regions instantiating properties—that it is more fundamental than,
50 Thus, at a more specific level, the candidate explanation that will be assessed below is the
more robust version provided by Schaffer—rather than a more bare-bones version of Priority
Monism.
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which renders these proper parts as derivative and non-fundamental entities that
depend upon the Cosmos for their existence.
Turning our attention to Priority Pluralism, adherents of this view see the
correct way to carve up the Cosmos as that of cutting it up into smaller pieces.
Specifically, this position of Priority Pluralism is a conjunction of the numerical
thesis concerning howmany fundamental entities there are—there being at least
two fundamental entities—and the partialistic thesis that the Cosmos is non-
fundamental (Schaffer 2010, 43). Thus, in providing a precisification of this view,
we can state the pluralistic position succinctly as follows:
(20) (Priority Pluralism) There exist many fundamental entities, which are the ontologi-
cally prior proper parts of the Cosmos and all other actual concrete objects.
Now, again, it is not built into the notion of Priority Pluralism that the numerous
fundamental entities that are taken to exist have any particular nature. Rather,
the notion so characterised, as with PriorityMonism, is strictly a numerical thesis
concerning the number of fundamental entities—which, for Priority Pluralism,
is that of there being many. However, a specific way of further detailing the
nature of these fundamental entities has been provided by Simons (2020).51 This
particular construal of Priority Pluralism is that of Atomism—the view in which
the fundamental concrete objects are mereological atoms. Priority Pluralism,
construed in this atomistic way, posits that all derivative entities—including
the Cosmos—are grounded in the collection of mereological atoms—which,
following Simons (2020), can be conceptualised as indivisible (point-particle
like) module tropes.52 The fundamental layer of reality is thus an indivisible
(because un-extended) collection of (point-particle like) module tropes that sup-
port the existence of all other non-fundamental entities. The Cosmos is itself
a non-fundamental entity and thus can be cut into mereologically minimal
slices.
Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism, so construed, are thus exhaustive
and exclusive positions due to the holding of what Schaffer (2018, §3.1) terms
the tiling constraint. The tiling constraint is the conjunction of the following two
51 Thus, again, at amore specific level, the candidate explanation that will be assessed below is
the more robust version provided by Simons—rather than a more bare-bones version of Priority
Pluralism.
52 Simons (2020) does not explicitly term his account a ‘priority pluralist’ account, nor does he
term the tropes that feature in his account ‘module tropes’. However, his atomistic account is
clearly one that affirms the central tenets of Priority Pluralism and, given the distinction that
was made earlier between modifier and module tropes, the concept of a trope that features in
Simons’ account is certainly that of the latter, rather than that of the former.
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conditions (where we can take the predicate ‘F’ to denote the property of being a
fundamental concrete object, and the letter ‘u’ to refer to the Cosmos):
(21) (Tiling)
(i) (Covering) Sum: x(Fx)= u
(ii) (No Overlap) (∀x)(∀y) ((Fx & Fy & x ≠ y) ⊃∼(∃z) (Pzx & Pzy)).
The first condition of the tiling constraint: (Covering), expresses the requirement
within fundamentalmereology that the sumof all fundamental entities is the Cos-
mos as a whole—there is no portion of the Cosmos which is thus left uncovered.
The second condition of the tiling constraint: (NoOverlap), expresses the require-
ment that the fundamental entities are not to have any common parts—thus,
these entities are mereologically disjoint. The picture that is given by these two
conditions is that of the fundamental entities tiling the cosmos in the sense
that they partition or cover every portion of reality without them overlapping
(Schaffer 2018, §3.1).
So, for Priority Monism, there is one, and only one, fundamental entity:
the whole Cosmos, which is prior to its proper parts—namely, all other existing
concrete entities. Whereas, for Priority Pluralism, there are many fundamental
entities, each of which is a proper part of the Cosmos, identified as mereological
atoms—namely, a collection of un-extended (point particle-like) module tropes.
We can illustrate theposition expressedbyPriorityMonismandPriority Pluralism




Thus, to reiterate a key point, the primary disagreement between Priority
Monism and Priority Pluralism does not concern the existence of the Cosmos,
material objects ormereological atoms—theseare all sharedassumptions.Rather,
given the tiling constraint, and the fact that Priority Monism is equivalent to
Fu—the Cosmos being a fundamental entity—and Priority Pluralism being equiv-
alent to∼Fu—theCosmosnotbeinga fundamental entity—these twopositionsare
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simply an exhaustive and exclusive way to carve up reality—stick with monism,
and you keep fundamental reality intact and whole, or go with pluralism, and
you cut fundamental reality down to its smallest pieces. Thus, the Cosmos, or the
collection of mereological atoms, if they exist in the manner so construed, exist
as fundamental entities through the tiling constraint enabling them to cover all of
reality—without anything else being above or beneath them. Taking all of these
things into account, these are the three candidate fundamental explanations of
our explanatory target. Now, to determine which of these options is to be deemed
as the fundamental explanation and terminus in explanation for the instantiation
of the relation of grounding on particular occasions within the layered structure
of reality, we must assess and compare the manner in which these explanations
fulfil our inductive criteria. This assessment will now be done by focusing first,
again, onTheismand then turningour attention toPrimitiveness, PriorityMonism
and Pluralism.
4.2 Assessment of Primitiveness and the Candidates
Theism has predictive power, in respect to our explanatory target, to the extent to
whichwe can attribute toGod an intention to instantiate the relation of grounding
on particular occasions within the layered structure of reality. This intention can
be indirectly shown to be had by God as follows: plausibly, it is the best kind
of action for God to bring about the existence of the non-fundamental entities
that are part of the layered structure of reality, given the unique goodness of this
action. Specifically, the performance of this action is a unique good due to the
holding of the Diffusiveness Principle, which can be stated as follows:
(22) (Diffusiveness) Goodness is necessarily diffusive of itself.
At a general level, according to the Diffusiveness Principle,53 goodness requires
something other than itself as a manifestation of itself. Hence, a good being
will inevitably bring about other good things. Thus, as it is better to exist than
not to exist—existence is a good thing—God, as Kretzmann (1991, 223) writes,
‘necessarily (thoughwith the freedomassociatedwithcounterfactual choice)wills
53 Though the Diffusiveness Principle is not currently a guiding principle within contemporary
metaphysics, it has a storied history, as shown by Kretzmann (1991) that stems from the work of
Plato, through Augustine and Aquinas and culminating in the work of Bonaventure—and so it
shouldnotbedismissedwithoutargument. Furthermore,unlike someotherprincipleswhichwill
be called into question below—such as that of the principle of unrestricted composition—this
principle does not clash with our intuitions and does not entail some further problematic
metaphysical theses. Hence, one should adopt this principle unless there is a good reason
not to—note, the lack of interest in the principle is not a successful rebutting or undercutting
defeater of it!
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the being of something other than himself’. In other words, as perfect goodness is
an essential ‘attribute’ of Godand self-diffusiveness is essential to goodness itself,
the existence of other entities outside of God will be an inevitable consequence
of God’s nature. In other words, the existence of other, non-fundamental (i.e.
dependent or grounded) entities will be the necessary result of God’s intention to
produce good things.54 Restating thiswithin ourmetaphysical context, God—who
is perfectly good—must diffuse his goodness by ‘grounding’ (i.e. metaphysically
causing) the existenceof these entities via the relationof grounding—God’s action
of ‘grounding’ the existence of non-fundamental entities is a product of his nature
that stems from him necessarily, yet wilfully, spreading his goodness in this cre-
ative act.55 Now, given that Godwill necessarily ground the existence of the other,
non-fundamental entities that are part of the layered structure of reality, we also
have the grounding coming along for the ride as well. More specifically, as noted
previously, grounding is a super-internal relation.56 A super-internal relation is
one such that the intrinsic nature of one of the relata guarantees not only that
the other relatum(a) exists—with the intrinsic nature that it does—but also that
the relation that connects these entities would obtain as well—thus we have an
54 One could say that God’s goodness would require him to diachronically cause—through the
relation of nomological causation—the existence of these entities at a certain point in time,
and then his goodness would also require him to synchronically cause—through the relation
of metaphysical causation (i.e. grounding)—the existence of these entities throughout each
moment of time. Thus, the ‘causation’ of these entities would have two stages: a diachronic
stage and a synchronic stage, that would involve two different types of relations—a nomological
causation relation and a metaphysical causation (i.e. grounding) relation, which fits well with
the traditional position that God brought all of created reality into existence and also sustains
all of created reality in existence at each moment of time.
55 That is, this diffusive act is not an ‘impersonal emanation’ of God but a personal act that
include,firstly,hispowers—thatenablehimtogroundtheexistenceofallothernon-fundamental
entities, secondly, his beliefs—that grounding the existence of other fundamental entities will
diffuse his goodness—and, thirdly, his purposes—to diffuse his goodness by grounding the
existence of all other, non-fundamental entities.
56 The following solution provided for the relational regress issue is that of Bennett’s (2011,
32–35; 2017, 192–198). For other types of responses to this issue, see deRosset (2013) and
Litland (2017), for a linking of grounding to explanatory arguments, and Fine (2012) and
Rosen (2010), for essentialist solutions to the issue.Now,Bennett doesnot identifywhich specific
fundamental entity would need to fulfil the role of stopping the regress by being the source of
the instantiation of the relation of grounding. Thus, the theistic context in which this solution
is explicated is original to this article. That is, God is taken here to be this fundamental entity;
importantly, however, this does not mean that, on the basis of super-internality of grounding
alone, other types of entities (such as the Cosmos or the collection ofmereological atoms) cannot
potentially fulfil this role as well—though these entities will be shown below to fail to fulfil this
role once other issues are taken into account.
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(indirect) entailment of the relation of grounding here. However, one can now
ask the important question now of if we accept this result would not we have
to face the problematic relational regress that was noted previously? Now, recall
that the problem raised by Primitiveness is that of there being a potentially infi-
nite regress of relations if one were to posit the fact of a relation of grounding
obtaining in virtue of something else—namely, it not being fundamental. That
is, if the grounding relation is instantiated in virtue of something else, such as
God, then, according to the proponent of Primitiveness, there apparently must
be a distinct dependence relation—not that of a relation of grounding in order to
ward off the self-explanatory issue—to do the work, which then, in turn, would
also need to obtain in virtue of something else, and so on and so forth. How-
ever, as Bennett (2011) has noted in a related context—despite the prima facie
plausibility of the issue raised here—the super-internality of grounding does,
in fact, deal with this problematic relational regress. This is simply because of
the fact that super-internal relations–such as grounding—are such that, given
the existence of the ground, there does not need to be anything else that exists
for it to ground the things that it does. That is, as Bennett (2011, 35) notes, ‘no
genuinely new relation needs to be postulated’. Thus, the relation of grounding
that links the grounding relation to its base is not an extra entity over and above
its base any more than the relation of grounding is. In other words, if we have
the grounding base, we have what exists in virtue of it—even when that is the
relation of grounding itself. In short, there is no need to postulate the existence
of any extra relations for God to serve as the ground of the non-fundamental
entities and the fundamental explanation of the instantiation of the relation of
grounding on particular occasions within the layered structure of reality. Thus, in
returning to our previous illustrationnoted above (i.e. Figure 3),we candepict this
regress now through Figure 7 as follows (with the again the arrows representing




Using our factive language again, for clarity and succinctness, we see that
the fact that G grounds A is grounded in the intrinsic nature of G and thus,
given this, we thus do still have a regress present; however, this regress has
now become unproblematic. As it is in virtue of the intrinsic nature of the facts
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about God—the more fundamental facts—that (a) the grounded facts—the less
fundamental facts—obtain and,more importantly, that (b) the grounding relation
between facts about God and the grounded facts obtains. That is, by the super-
internality of grounding, the fact that the grounded facts are grounded in facts
about God is itself grounded in facts about God, and so on and so forth. In short,
the grounds: God, grounds grounding. Hence, we thus have an unproblematic
regress on the basis of the formal features of grounding (i.e. its super-internality).
Thus, again in the language of relations and facts, we can, therefore, reach the
position that, as God’s (perfectly good) intentions are always realised, if there
is a God, we can expect—with a level of certainty—that there will also be an
instantiated relation of grounding that connects him to the non-fundamental
entities that he necessarily grounds.57 Theism thus fulfils Criterion (i) to a very
high level.
Corresponding to this, we can also see the central claim provided by The-
ism—that there is a God, a metaphysically simple, omnipotence-trope—fits
very well with our background knowledge as it posits the existence of certain
a type of entity—a trope—that is at the foundation of contemporary meta-
physics—or, at least, as with grounding, is a ‘major concern of metaphysics’.
Specifically, tropes are a standard feature of most current day ontologies—where
influentialmetaphysicians such asWilliams (1953, 1986), Campbell (1990), Schaf-
fer (2001), Simons (1994), Maurin (2002, 2018), Ehring (2011), McDaniel (2001),
and Loux (2015), all have utilised the concept of a trope within their ontological
system. Moreover, tropes do not only feature in the ontological systems of various
metaphysicians, but are also plausible options for dealing with various issues
within contemporary philosophy. That is, tropes, amongst other things, find their
use in themetaphysics of properties by providing ameans for one to affirm a form
of realism (Keinänen, Hakkarainen, and Keskinen 2016), or, in the metaphysics
of persistence and identity by providing a basis for the notions of endurance
and perdurance (Benovsky 2013), or, in the philosophy of physics by providing
a philosophical basis for quantum theory and the Standard Model of elemen-
tary particles (Morganti 2009). Plausibly, the belief in the existence of tropes is
widespread in contemporary metaphysics, and thus the postulation of the exis-
tence of God, identified as a (module) trope, meshes well with other theories from
57 An objection that can be raised here is how God’s perfect freedom can be preserved given the
Diffusiveness Principle. Well, in answer to this, following Kretzmann (1991, 223), we can say that
God’s freedom of choice is solely confined to his selection of what possibilities to actualise—God
is necessitated as regards to whether to ground anything, yet he is perfectly free in regards to
what he is to ground.
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the neighbouring fields within contemporary metaphysics.58 Theism thus fulfils
Criterion (ii) to a significant level.
Furthermore,Theismisalsoaverysimpleexplanation,or, in fact, thesimplest
possible personal fundamental explanation, as it explains the various phenom-
ena of reality in terms of the powerful action of one fundamental personal entity:
God—rather than many personal entities—and thus it is an explanation that is
quantitatively simple—it is simpler than any other polytheistic based personal
explanation. However, Theism is not only quantitively simple, but it is also qual-
itatively simple, in the sense that it postulates the existence of the simplest kind
of personal entity. That is, as God ismetaphysically simple, and thus lacks proper
parts, God has the fewest number and kind of fundamental properties possible:
zero. As, instead of possessing properties, each attributionmade of God is numer-
ically identical to him—God’s attributes are God himself. There is thus no further
explanation that is needed to be provided for why God has the properties that he
does—as he does not have any properties. Furthermore, as Theism identifies God
as a trope (of a modular kind), it posits the existence of an entity of the fewest
number of fundamental kinds: one. Assuming the correctness of ‘Classical Trope
Theory’, tropes allow one to affirm the existence of one ontological kind or cate-
gory: the kind or category ‘trope’, with the other kinds or categories of ‘substance’
and ‘universals’ being denied.59 Thus, by Theism positing the existence of God,
58 One could raise the objection here that the notion of a ‘personal’ trope is not widespread in
contemporary metaphysics, and thus Theism does not mesh well with our background knowl-
edge. In response to this issue, one can emphasise the importance of the type/token distinction
for the Criterion of Background Knowledge. That is, for the postulation of the existence of an
entity to be such as to fit within our background knowledge, this entity simply needs to be of
a class (i.e. a type) of entities that are taken to exist within other fields; rather than it being a
particular instance of this class (i.e. a token) that is regularly seen to be duplicated (as if this
were, in fact, the case, then one would not be able to make discoveries of new instances of a
given class, which one clearly can). Thus, even though God is a personal module trope—that is,
he is able to be ’picked out’ from the class of tropes by being personal (amongst other things)—as
tropes are a class of entities that are widely taken to exist in other fields within contemporary
metaphysics (outside of the field of analytic philosophy of religion and analytic theology), the
postulation of the existence of God is a postulation of a type of entity that does, in fact, fit within
our background knowledge—even if he is a unique instance of this kind. Whereas, for example,
if one were to assume Swinburne’s (2016, 103–126) construal of God as an omnipresent spirit,
God would indeed be a type of entity that does not fit within our background knowledge, as
spirits are not widely taken to exist in other fields within contemporary metaphysics (outside of
the field of analytic philosophy of religion and analytic theology).
59 This is due to the fact of a trope being able to play the role of a substance—through forming
a compresent bundle with other tropes—and universal—through the process of abstraction
enabling one to fictionally treat a class of trope as universal-like entities.
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oneonlyhas tobe committed to the existenceof one fundamental ontological kind
or category, and thus this type of fundamental explanation allows one to continue
to have a very parsimonious ontology. Theism is thus quantitatively and qualita-
tively the simplest personal and—as will be shown below—possible explanation,
due to the fact that it postulates the fewest number and kind of fundamental
entities: one, with the fewest number and kind of fundamental properties: zero.
Theism thus fulfils Criterion (iv) as well.
Therefore, within our context of analysis, Theism provides the simplest kind
of personal fundamental explanation that fits with our background knowledge
and leads us to expect (with a level of certainty) the instantiation of the relation of
grounding on particular occasions within the layered structure of reality. Theism
thus fulfils all of the relevant components of our inductive criteria. The question
that now presents itself is: does the thesis of Primitiveness and the other possi-
ble anti-primitive alternative fundamental explanations of Priority Monism and
Priority Pluralism do so as well?
First, forPrimitiveness, there isapostulationmadeconcerning the fundamen-
talityof the relationofgrounding—namely, the relation is itself fundamental—due
to the fact this relation is instantiated without any further explanation for its
instantiation. One can ask, however, if we are indeed led to expect this data—that
is, should we expect to find the relation of grounding, without, however, this
relation being instantiated in virtue of any deeper, more fundamental entity (or
relation)? I believe not. As, given Sider’s (2011, 106–107) purity principle,60 which
can be stated succinctly as follows:
(23) (Purity) Fundamental truths only contain fundamental notions.
According to this principle, as Sider (2011, 107) notes, there is a requirement that
‘facts about the relationship between the fundamental and the non-fundamental
[must] themselves [be] non-fundamental’. That is, as thegrounding connectsnon-
fundamental entities to fundamental entities (or othernon-fundamental entities),
this relation takes on the quality of being non-fundamental, such that, as Ben-
nett (2017, 189) writes, it becomes ‘tainted by the non-fundamental thing on one
side’. Hence, it follows from the purity principle that no relation of grounding
can be fundamental—the connection between the fundamental and the non-
fundamental cannot itself be fundamental. In other words, given the purity
principle, we are not to expect any of the grounding relations that connect entities
within the layered structure of reality to be instantiated on a particular occasion,
60 Builes (2018, 5) sees the plausibility of this principle to be grounded upon the fact that it is
highly intuitive, which is brought out by the following statement of the principle by Sider (2011,
106) ‘whenGodwascreating theworld, shewasnot required to think in termsofnon-fundamental
notions like city, smile, or candy’.
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if there is no further, more fundamental entity that they are instantiated in virtue
of. The predictive power of Primitiveness is thus very low.
Second, for Priority Monism, there is a postulation made concerning the
existence of a fundamental entity: the Cosmos. This entity is identified as the
spacetime manifold, with all other existing material objects being identified as
spacetime regions that are dependent, proper parts of the Cosmos. Whereas, for
Priority Pluralism, there is a postulation made concerning the existence of a col-
lection of mereological atoms, identified as (point-particle like) module tropes,
that make up, as proper parts, the larger existing concrete objects, and thus ulti-
mately the Cosmos. So, or Priority Monism, there is thus the postulation of the
existence of one fundamental entity, and for Priority Pluralism, there is the pos-
tulation of many fundamental entities. In regards to the predictive power of both
explanations, however, it is clear that each of these explanations would possess
a low predictive power in relation to our explanatory target, primarily due to the
fact that we have no reason to expect there to be any grounding relations within
the layered structure of reality, on the basis of the entities that are postulated by
these two explanations. That is, on the one hand, even though individuals such as
Schaffer (2010) take it to be the case that grounding plays an important role in the
theses of Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism, what is, in fact, firstly, inbuilt
into Priority Monism is of that the Cosmos being the sole fundamental entity that
also has other existing concrete objects as non-fundamental proper parts of it.
And, secondly, what is, in fact, also inbuilt into Priority Pluralism is that of the
existing concrete objects being non-fundamental entities that are composed by
the collection of fundamental mereological atoms—that is, the non-fundamental
entities are decomposable into these very atoms. Thus, contra Schaffer, what is
in fact entailed by both explanations is that of the instantiation of a relation of
composition—rather than that of a relation of grounding—which then connects
the fundamental entities (i.e. the Cosmos or the mereological atoms) to the non-
fundamental entities (i.e. the concrete objects) within the layered structure of
reality. Now, as composition is not identical to grounding—as both relations have
different formal properties, specifically, that of composition being a reflexive rela-
tion and grounding being an irreflexive relation—one needs an additional reason
to take there to also be a relation of grounding that exists over and above that of
the relation of composition.61 Therefore, in the absence of this reason, what we
61 Wilson (2014) does take composition to be a small ’g’ grounding relation. However, she does
this in rejection of the traditional understanding of grounding, and thus if one wants to affirm
the reality of the relation of grounding, then one is not advised to adopt the approach proposed
by her here.
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do not have is any reason to expect the instantiation of the relation of grounding
within the layered structure of reality—on the basis of the existence of the Cos-
mos or the many fundamental mereological atoms. Thus, as with Primitiveness,
the predictive power of Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism are low as well.
That is, Primitiveness, Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism thus fail to fulfil
Criterion (i).
For the fitwith backgroundknowledge,we can also see that each of these the-
ses fail to fulfil this task as well. As, firstly, for Primitiveness, as noted previously,
grounding is a relation that is a species of causation (i.e. metaphysical causation)
and thus, the type of relation that it is—namely, a causal relation—is one that
is readily accepted within the wider field of metaphysics. However, despite the
correspondencewith our background knowledge, we appear to face an issuewith
this thesis’ fit with a plausible principle that is situated within our background
knowledge—namely, a principle of modal recombination, which can be stated
precisely as follows:
(24) (Recombination) All logically possible combinations of these fundamental elements
are metaphysically possible.
That is, it is reasonably the case that the fundamental elements that are part of
the layered structure of reality are open to free modal recombination; as Schaf-
fer (2010, 40) writes, the ‘fundamental actual concrete objects should be freely
recombinable, serving as independent units of being . . . Thus each should be,
in Hume’s words, ‘entirely loose and separate’. As a fundamental entity does not
depend upon anything else, it should thus not be modally constrained in any
way. Hence, as Bennett (2011, 27; 2017, 191) argues, if grounding is indeed con-
ceived of as a fundamental relation—such that it is not instantiated in virtue of
anything else—then there will be a world w that is just like the actual world in
terms of the distribution of all the rest of the fundamental entities, expect that
nothing grounds anything else in w. Thus, any actually grounded entity in w
must thus either fail to exist or be fundamental in w, both of which seem to be
implausible. Therefore, as Bennett (2011, 27) writes, ‘grounding is not amenable
to free recombination, and thus is not fundamental’. Primitiveness thus seems
to transgress a principle of modal recombination that can plausibly be taken to
be part of our background knowledge—and thus, this thesis fails to correspond
to it.
Secondly, for Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism, we have a similar
conclusion being reached, where, for the former, there is a certain fit with our
background knowledge through the notion of substantivalism (i.e. the thesis that
the Cosmos is a spacetime substance that is non-derivative (i.e. fundamental))
being taken by various philosophers to be a potentially correct understanding of
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the nature of the Cosmos.62 And, for the latter, there is also a certain fit with our
background knowledge through the concept of a trope, as noted previously, being
awidely usednotionwithin the various fields of contemporarymetaphysics.How-
ever, where we see there to be a clash with our background knowledge for both of
these theses is as follows: for Priority Monism, as noted by Le Bihan (2018), there
seems to be a tension between it and the wider field of contemporary theoretical
physics—and the field of the philosophy of physics, which it is grounded upon.
Specifically, certain promising research programs in quantum gravity, such as
loop quantum gravity and string theory, are taken by certain physicists to deny
the fundamentality of spacetime (Le Bihan 2018). However, as the version of Pri-
ority Monism (with its assumption of the notion of substantivalism) that is under
analysis identifies fundamental spacetime with the fundamental structure of the
layered structure of reality—namely, the Cosmos—the denial of the fundamental-
ity of spacetime in these views might undermine the notion of Priority Monism.
That is, as Le Bihan (2018, 9) notes, for these reasons, ‘priority monism, with its
commitment to a fundamental spacetime, is at risk of being empirically refuted
by the forthcoming physics’. Thus, to ward off this issue, one must drop this core
assumption of the fundamental structure of reality being spatio-temporal—which
has been suggested by Le Bihan (2018)—however, if this path is taken, then one
will also lose one of the central ways of demonstrating the correspondence of
Priority Monism with our background knowledge—primarily, that of the wide
acceptance of the notion of substantivalism—which would thus result in one
being faced with the same issue of Priority Monism failing to fit with our back-
ground knowledge. Thus, as it stands, on the basis of Priority Monism failing to
correspond with (and actually be taken to transgress) the more well-established
theses within the wider field of contemporary physics, it does not fit well with our
background knowledge.
For Priority Pluralism, we do not have a transgression per se but the require-
ment for one to be committed to a highly controversial principle: the principle of
unrestricted composition, which can be stated succinctly as follows:
(25) (Unrestricted) Every plurality of objects composes something.
One must affirm this principle—or something like it—in order for the thesis of
Priority Pluralism to even get off the ground, as one can indeed ask the question
62 More specifically, the particular conception of substantivalism that is at the centre of the
version of Priority Monism here is that of super-substantivalism—the view that the Cosmos is a
spacetime substance that is the only fundamental entity. Nevertheless, the notion of substanti-
valism is at the core of this specific position, which is simply an additional numerical thesis. For
a further explanation of substantivalism and the various conceptions of it on offer, see Huggett
and Hoefer (2015).
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that, given the fact that a certain collection of mereological atoms exists, why
does it follow with certainty from the mere existence of these atoms that they
compose anything? It followswith certainty if one is committed to the principle of
unrestricted composition, but then one can ask the further question of why one
should be committed to such a principle being included within our background
knowledge, especially given the fact that this principle is itself highly controver-
sial?AsCotnoir andVarzi (2021, 195) note, that individualshave regularly objected
to this principle based on the fact that it would ‘force us to accept the existence of
all sorts of unheard-of entities that common sense does not recognize, such as a
fusion of all cats, or the sumof a person’s foot and a carburetor’.63 Furthermore, in
addition to the counter-intuitiveness of this principle, individuals have also held
to it being one that carries with it significantly high costs, as Markosian (2008,
360, square parenthesis added) writes:
Choosing among alternative philosophical theories always involves a cost-benefit analysis
. . . but to many of us, such costs as accepting brute compositional facts or admitting
genuinevagueness into theworldare relativelyminorwhencompared to the triplewhammy
associatedwith [unrestricted composition]. For theproponent of [unrestricted composition]
must first accept all of the many counterintuitive objects that the view entails; then he is
forced to endorse the [Four-Dimensional] view of persistence; and, finally, he must also
accept [unrestricted composition with unrestricted diachronic identity], with its radical
and bizarre conception of persisting objects. In light of all of this, the choice for many of us
will be clear: one way or another, composition must be restricted.
Thus, given the problematic affirmation of the principle of unrestricted compo-
sition that Priority Pluralism requires one to make, one can indeed hesitate, as
with that of Priority Monism, to take this to be a thesis that does, in fact, fit with
our background knowledge. Therefore, given these issues, Criterion (ii) is thus
also not sufficientlymet by Primitiveness and the two anti-primitive explanations
of Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism. Thus, the question now is: can Prim-
itiveness, Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism meet the final Criterion—the
Criterion of Simplicity—instead? The answer to this is quite clearly again in the
negative. As, first, Primitiveness fails to be quantitatively simple and/or qual-
itatively simple. That is, if one conceives of Primitiveness through the lens of
grounding monism—which posits the fact of there being a single, generic rela-
tion of grounding—then this thesis is indeed qualitatively simple, as it postulates
the existence of the fewest kinds of fundamental entities—one, generic kind of
63 On the basis of the work of Lewis (1991), who argued for the ‘ontological innocence’ of
classical extensional mereology, Cotnoir and Varzi (2021, 194–197) go on to show how one is
required to affirm the further controversial thesis of Composition as Identity in order to deal with
this problem.
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fundamental relation. However, it fails to be quantitively simple as it does not
posit the existence of the fewest number of fundamental entities—as it would
require a wide number of tokens of the grounding relation to be instantiated in
order for the various non-fundamental entities to be connected to one another
within the layered structure of reality.64 Yet, on the other hand, if one were to
conceive of Primitiveness through the lens of grounding pluralism—which posits
the fact of there being a variety of relations of grounding—then this thesis would
face an even more challenging issue of it failing to be both quantitively and qual-
itatively simple, as it does not postulate the existence of the fewest number of
fundamental entities—rather, as with grounding monism, it would posit a large
number of tokens of the grounding relation that are instantiated on a particular
occasion within the layered structure of reality. Moreover, it would also not posit
the fewest kinds of fundamental entities, as it postulates the instantiation of a
wide variety of different kinds of grounding relations for different contexts—with
moderate grounding pluralism positing the existence (and/or instantiation) of at
least three grounding relations, and extreme grounding pluralism positing the
existence (and/or instantiation) of at least five grounding relations. Primitivism,
under both conceptions, is thus a thesis that is quantitative and/or qualitatively
complex. Second, and in turning our attention to anti-primitivist options on the
table: Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism, Priority Monism is a thesis that is
quantitatively simple, but fails to be qualitatively simple, and Priority Pluralism
is a thesis that is qualitatively simple, but fails to be quantitatively simple. That
is, on the one hand, Priority Monism postulates the existence of one fundamen-
tal concrete object: the Cosmos, and thus postulates the existence of the fewest
number of fundamental entities—one. Yet, it does not postulate the fewest kinds
of entities or the fewest number or kinds of fundamental properties. That is, for
the former, it fails to do this by assuming a two-category ontology—substance
and attribute/tropes—where the Cosmos is the one fundamental substance that
instantiates various universals, or is constituted by various tropes. Therefore, if
one is thus to affirm the veracity of Priority Monism, then onemust also affirm the
veracity of this type of ontology, and therefore be saddled with the issues that are
present within this type of ontology (such as Bradley’s Regress).65 Moreover, for
the latter, as the Cosmos is the spacetime manifold that has material objects as
proper parts of it in the form of spacetime regions, the properties of thesematerial
64 As seen in Figure 2, there are at least four tokens needed.
65 This conclusion, however, is only reached by the version of Priority Monism that has been
assumed throughout this article. I thus leave it as an open issue for further research whether
other conceptions of PriorityMonism (suchasPriorityMonismcombinedwithnominalism)must
also reach this conclusion.
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objects are ‘pinned’ onto the Cosmos itself. The Cosmos thus instantiates a nearly
infinitenumberof properties. TheCosmos, as construed in thisway,would thusbe
many propertied, which renders Priority Monism as qualitatively complex rather
than simple. On the other hand, we have Priority Pluralism which postulates
the existence of many fundamental objects—many mereological atoms, that, as
module tropes would be metaphysically simple—and thus, it posits the existence
of the fewest number and kind of fundamental properties—zero properties. Yet,
as there needs to be a near-infinite number of existing mereological atoms for the
composition of the variety of actual material objects that are part of the layered
structure of reality. There are thus many mereological atoms, which renders Pri-
ority Pluralism as quantitatively complex rather than simple. Primitivism and the
two anti-Primitivist explanations on offer thus each fail to fulfil Criterion (iv), and,
therefore, taken this together now with the previous criteria, each of these the-
ses—Primitivism, Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism—are ones that, firstly,
fail to predict the data at hand, secondly, fail to fit with our background knowl-
edge, and thirdly, are each taken to be complex theses. It will be important now
to compare the results reached here with that of the thesis of Theism.
In regards to the occurrence of our explanatory target—the instantiation of
the relation of grounding on particular occasions—we have one primitive the-
sis: Primitivism, and three candidate fundamental explanations: Theism, Priority
MonismandPriority Pluralism.With the anti-primitive explanation of Theism,we
have a candidate fundamental explanation that fits with our background knowl-
edge and yields (or predict) the data to an extremely high level. However, what we
find with the thesis of Primitivism and the two other anti-primitive explanations:
Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism, is that of there being a postulation made
concerning the nature of certain fundamental entities—the relation of grounding,
the Cosmos or the collection of mereological atoms—that do not fit with our back-
ground knowledge and yield (or predict) the data to any significant level—that
is, these theses have elements that do not fit with our wider knowledge of the
world and, more importantly, our explanatory target is not to be expected, given
the truth of these theses. Furthermore, with the entities expressed by Primi-
tivism, Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism, we also have a set of theses that
are each less simple than the postulation made by Theism. That is, Theism,
as noted above, postulates the existence of one fundamental entity: God. This
single fundamental entity is a metaphysically simple omnipotence trope (who
is identical to each of the attributes ascribed to him) and thus instantiates zero
properties. Theism—unlikePrimitivism (as conceived throughgroundingmonism
and pluralism) and Priority Pluralism—postulates the fewest number of funda-
mental entities—one module trope, rather than many token relations or module
tropes—and—unlikePrimitivism(asconceived throughgroundingpluralism)and
Grounding and the Existence of God | 49
PriorityMonism—itpostulates the fewest kindof fundamental entities—onekind:
trope, rather than many kinds, or (at least) two kinds: substance and attributes.
Furthermore, it postulates the fewest number and kind of fundamental proper-
ties—zero properties, rather than many. Thus, in comparison to Primitiveness,
Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism, Theism is a simpler explanation of our
explanatory target. In otherwords, Theism fulfils our inductive criteria to a greater
extent than the primitive option and the other alternative inanimate fundamental
explanations that are available. And thus, given this, we have a good reason to
take these latter anti-primitive explanations to solely be fullmetaphysical expla-
nationsofourexplanatory target (i.e.metaphysical explanations that fullyexplain
the data, yet have a further synchronic explanation for them), rather than funda-
mental explanations (i.e. metaphysical explanations that fully explain the data
and do not have a further synchronic explanation for them) that can each serve as
a terminus in explanation for the instantiation of the relation of grounding. More
specifically, as noted previously, if one can formulate an explanation that allows
us to have a metaphysical explanation with a greater fulfilment of our inductive
criteria than the existing options, without also there being a corresponding loss
in the fulfilment of any other of the components of the criteria, such as fit with
background knowledge, predictive power or simplicity, thenwe have good reason
to adopt that explanation as being the fundamental explanation for our explana-
tory target. Theism, in comparison to Primitiveness, Priority Monism and Priority
Pluralism, is the simplest explanation, fitting with our background knowledge,
that leads us to expect the instantiation of the relation of grounding on particular
occasions within the layered structure of reality, when otherwise we would not
expect for this to occur.
God thus acts as the fundamental source of the relation of grounding—his
existence is sufficient for instantiation of this relation that connects the various
entities within the layered structure of reality (and back a metaphysical expla-
nation for them existing as they do). In other words, the existence of God thus
provides a sufficient fundamental explanation for reality having the structure
that it does. And, importantly, we do not need to search for a further explanation
beyondGod, as being ametaphysically simple entity that exists fundamentally, his
existence is inexplicable, andhis grounding agency necessitates the instantiation
of this relation, without there being any type of problematic regress. In short, the
structure of reality has God, and God alone as its architect. And thus, given this,
we have a successful abductive argument for the existence of God, by the postula-
tion of his existence providing us with the best, or more specifically, the only true
fundamental explanation for the instantiation of the relation of groundingwithin
the layered structure of reality. We thus have one more good reason to believe in
the existence of God.
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5 Conclusions
In conclusion, in section one, an explanatory framework was established, which
provided us with the needed tools: an inductive criteria, to assess the poten-
tial worth of a given metaphysical explanation. In section two, our explanatory
target was detailed: that of the instantiation of the relation of grounding on
particular occasions. And the nature of this explanatory target was further elu-
cidated within a certain metaphysical picture concerning the layered structure
of reality. In section three, a primitive thesis—termed Primitiveness—and some
candidates for a fundamental explanation of our explanatory target were detailed
and assessed for their fulfilment of our inductive criteria. These candidates were:
Theism, Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism. In this assessment, Theism was
shown to be an explanation that fulfils the inductive criteria to a greater level
than Primitiveness and the alternative explanations of Priority Monism and Pri-
ority Pluralism. Thus, Theism provides the simplest explanation, fitting with our
background knowledge, that leads us to expect instantiation of the relation of
grounding on particular occasions within the layered structure of reality, when
otherwise we would not be expected for this to occur. Theism is the sole true
fundamental explanation of our explanatory target. And, therefore, given the
instantiation of the relation of grounding on particular occasions, we thus have
another good (abductive) reason to believe that God exists as well.
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